VOLUNTAS MILITUM: COMMUNITY, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND POPULAR POWER IN THE ARMIES OF THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC (300-100 BCE)

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Dominic M. Machado

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Chapter 0:
INTRODUCTION

0.0: The Roman Army at Rhegium

In the immediate aftermath of the Pyrrhic War, the Roman Forum was witness to a gruesome scene. At some point in the late 270s BCE, several hundred Campanian soldiers serving in the Roman army were led into the Forum where they were summarily scourged and beheaded, a punishment which Polybius notes was "in accordance with Roman custom" (κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος).[1] The ignominy that these men faced did not end with death; the mourning and burial of the dead was allegedly forbidden by a decree of the Senate.[2] The steep price paid by these soldiers was a consequence of their disobedience in the field. Several years earlier, they had participated in an unauthorized takeover of Rhegium, a southern Italian town sitting on the toe of Italy's boot.

The gruesome and brutal punishments meted out to the soldiers in this episode is certainly shocking to the modern observer. Indeed, it would have been an arresting image even for ancient readers. The second-century BCE Greek audience reading Polybius' account of the incident would have found several aspects of the scene hair raising, in particular, the defilement of a

1 Polyb. 1.7.12. All translations unless otherwise noted are my own.
2 Val. Max. 2.7.15; Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.38.

ritual space like the *agora* and the use of decapitation as a form of capital punishment.[3] Polybius takes full advantage of the shock value that the episode generates. The scene is the first appearance of the Romans in his text and, as such, the Greek historian uses it to give his reader a broader sense of their national character. An important part of Polybius' ploy is that his Greek readers would not have only viewed such behavior as shocking, but as typical of barbarians.[4] Polybius was emulating the well-pedigreed Greek tradition of depicting barbarians as engaging in various forms of brutal and inhumane slaughter.[5]

However, as Erskine argues, barbaric brutality does not quite do justice to Polybius' characterization of the Romans in this episode.[6] While barbarians can engage in such behavior without any forethought, the Romans have an underlying aim in their harsh punishment of the soldiers. Their objective, according to Polybius, was to maintain military discipline and to ensure that soldiers serving in the Roman army would never again engage in such acts of insubordination. It should hardly be surprising that Polybius, who saw order and efficiency in the form of military discipline as a driving force in the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean, wanted this aspect of the Roman character to become immediately apparent to his audience.[7] As such, Polybius' Romans are introduced to his readers as doubly terrifying. Not only were they brutal like barbarians, but their brutality performed an important and effective function: it transformed their military forces into a well-disciplined and ordered unit that would eventually conquer the entire Mediterranean.

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3 Parker 1983, 19; Erskine 2013b, 121-122. While execution did occur in the ancient Greek world, it usually did not involve the spilling of blood (e.g. Plut. *Agis* 19-20 for strangulation as a less bloody form of execution).

4 It is interesting to note that Polybius himself never uses the term βάρβαροι of the Romans. The three instances in which the Romans are referred to as such in his *Histories* occur in speeches (cf. Agelaus' speech at 5.104.1-11, Lyciscus' speech at 9.32.3-39.7 and Thrasycrates' speech at 11.4.1-6.8). Champion 2000, 425-444 discusses all three incidents and their implications for Polybius' view of the Romans more broadly.

5 Cf. Aesch. *Pers*. 371; Hdt. 9.78-9. For more on decapitation as a form of punishment among the Romans, see Voisin 1984, 241-293; Bauman 1996, 18-19. On capital punishment in antiquity more generally, see Cantarella 2011.

6 Erskine 2013b, 123-124.

7 As exemplified by Polybius' discussion of military order and efficiency in Book 6 (e.g. Polyb. 6.19.5-20.7, 6.37.1-23). Champion 2004, 67-94; Erskine 2013a, 231-246 provide a discussion of how military order and efficiency function in Polybius' explanation of Roman success.

Ancient and modern authorities have generally followed Polybius' focus on military discipline in their analysis of this scene. The actions taken by the Roman state to reprimand the soldiers at Rhegium and the publicity surrounding the punishment have been viewed as evidence of the centrality of discipline and obedience in the construction of Roman military culture as early as the third century BCE.[8] There is, however, another side to this story that has received little attention. Given the alleged centrality of discipline and obedience in the Roman army, why did the soldiers at Rhegium commit an act that amounted to treason and risk the possibility of such a brutal punishment?

While many of the details of the sacking of Rhegium are uncertain, the ancient sources allow us to construct a basic narrative of events.[9] During the late 280s, a Roman army consisting of a few thousand Campanian soldiers was sent to garrison Rhegium, which had appealed to Rome for protection against either Pyrrhus or the powerful southern Italian communities of Tarentum and Bruttium.[10] After a few years in Rhegium without incident, the soldiers massacred and expelled its inhabitants and took over the town.[11] The soldiers remained in control of the town for several years while the Romans were occupied with the war against Pyrrhus and the Greeks in southern Italy. Once these difficulties had abated, the Romans sent a second army to besiege Rhegium, which defeated the garrison after a protracted engagement. Most of the rebellious soldiers at Rhegium were killed in the siege, but the few who survived were sent to Rome and punished as described above. Our sources are largely in agreement as to why the soldiers at Rhegium attempted such a bold endeavor. Beginning with Polybius, the tradition holds that the troops were

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8 Valerius Maximus, Livy, and Frontinus all focus on the exemplary nature of the punishment the soldiers to highlight the severity of Roman military discipline (cf. Machado 2021 which examines the tension between Polybius' description of discipline and actual Roman practice). Rampelberg 1988, 599-618 discusses the event as an instance of mass punishment and Stewart 2012, 88-92 argues that mass execution was employed as a method of control and coercion against both slaves and soldiers during the third and second century BCE.

9 The list of sources that discuss the episode at Rhegium is long: Polyb. 1.7.6-13 (whose account according to Gelzer 1933, 133-135 derives from Fabius Pictor); Livy *Per.* 12, 15; Livy 28.28.1-6, 31.31.6-7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4-5; Diod. Sic. 22.1.2-3; Val. Max. 2.7.15; Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.38; App. *Sam.* 19-21; Cass. Dio fg. 40.7-12; Oros. 4.3.3-5.

10 Walbank 1957, 1.52-53 lays out the difficulties in establishing 1) when the garrison was established; 2) the size of the garrison and 3) the Roman and/or southern Italian involvement in the incident.

11 There is some debate whether all the Rhegian citizens were killed or just the aristocracy as in the accounts of Livy and Cassius Dio.

captivated by Rhegium's significant wealth and grew envious of the affluence and prosperity of its inhabitants.[12] The Roman soldiers – particularly, their commander, Decius Vibellius, a military tribune of Campanian origin – were unable to control their desires and devised a plan to take over the town and dispossess its inhabitants.

But the explanation that the sources provide does not hold up to historical scrutiny; the ancient accounts of the episode are replete with well-documented historiographical tropes. The impetuosity of the troops at Rhegium is consonant with elite perceptions of the army. Ancient historians, by and large, considered the soldiery as an armed and more dangerous extension of the *plebs/demos*: fickle, irrational, and incapable of moderation.[13] Further, the focus on the Campanian identity of the troops and their commander, Decius Vibellius, renders suspect claims about the envy inspired by the wealth of Rhegium and the devious manner in which the town was captured.[14] As a result of the defection of Rome's Campanian allies during the Second Punic War, Roman historians were notably hostile towards the region's inhabitants. They claimed that the fertility of Campanian land generated excessive wealth, creating a culture of indolence, greed, and immorality for its citizens.[15] In this scene, the use of these well-worn tropes serves the purpose of placing blame on the shoulders of the Campanian soldiers at Rhegium and deemphasizes Rome's conspicuous lack of action during the episode.[16] The standard narrative of the ancient sources offers hardly any insight into the circumstances that motivated the behavior of the Roman army at Rhegium.

An alternative and more interesting explanation for the behavior of the soldiers at Rhegium, however, is found in Livy's account of the event.[17]

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12 Polyb. 1.7.8; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.3; App. *Sam*. 19.

13 Eckstein 1995, 165-172; Fulkerson 2013, 162-167. Milne 2009 discusses the construction of the Roman soldier in the Republican period more generally.

14 Syme 1955, 129 discusses Decius' origin and family (cf. Cic. *de Lege Agraria* 2.93).

15 Oakley 1998, 289-290, 302-303, 366; Burton 2011, 252-254.

16 Dench 1995, 78-79; Champion 2004, 106-107 (pace Miltsios 2013, 23-24) emphasize this aspect of the passage.

17 Dionysius of Halicarnassus also offers an alternative explanation for the actions of the soldiers. Dionysius claims that Decius was able to incite the soldiers to take over the town by informing them that the Rhegians were about to stage a revolt, slaughter the garrison, and hand the town over to Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.4). While Decius was making this pronouncement to his soldiers, a messenger arrived bearing a letter which claimed that Pyrrhus was sending 500 soldiers to take over the city. Dionysius provides two different explanations of the letter's origin. The first relates that the letter was written by Decius himself; while the second

Although Livy's narrative of the incident at Rhegium in Books 12 and 15 has been lost, the episode is discussed in some detail in a speech delivered by Scipio Africanus to his mutinous troops in Hispania in 206.[18] Scipio brings up the takeover of Rhegium in the context of asking his soldiers what exactly they hoped to achieve through their seditious behavior (*quae mens, quod consilium uestrum fuerit scire uelim*).[19] Despite Scipio's claim that no such behavior is ever justifiable (*quamquam nullum scelus rationem habet*), he notes that the capture of Rhegium by Decius' army was motivated by rational thinking when compared with the actions of his own rebellious soldiers.[20] He says that the soldiers at Rhegium acted within the framework of the Roman army, describing the group of soldiers as a *legio* who followed the orders of a Roman officer, the military tribune, Decius Vibellius (*sed D. Uibellium tribunum militum secuti sunt*).[21] On the other hand, his own soldiers chose to break away from their commander and follow an Umbrian *semilixa*. Further, Scipio points out that the actions of the soldiers at Rhegium did not harm the Roman state, but rather strove for the betterment of their own situation. Unlike the soldiers in his own army who reached out to the leaders of the enemy forces, Indibilis and Mandonius, the soldiers garrisoned at Rhegium had no contact with any of the various Roman enemies who lurked in southern Italy like Pyrrhus or the Samnites and Lucanians.[22] The army at Rhegium saw the wealthy city as a permanent place to settle and their actions followed a contemporary precedent set by the seizure of Capua by the Etruscans and Messana by the Mamertines.[23] There was no such precedent for Scipio's army nor was the land suitable for his troops to settle as Hispania was much too far from the families of these soldiers.[24]

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claims that the letter was sent by the consul, Fabricius (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.5-6). The former of these stories is unexceptional and fits with the general narrative found in the other ancient historians. The latter of these two stories, however, would imply Roman complicity in the slaughter of the Rhegians. Such a conspiracy seems unlikely, since in Dionysius' account, it is Fabricius himself who four years later attacks the garrison at Rhegium and restores the town to its former inhabitants (*pace* Dench 1995, 78-79 and Fronda 2010, 174).

18 Livy had his own version of the incident at Rhegium; the author of the *Periochae* tells us that he chronicled the scene in Books 12 and 15.

19 Livy 28.28.1.

20 Livy 28.28.1.

21 Livy 28.28.4.

22 Livy 28.28.4-5.

23 Livy 28.28.6.

24 Livy 28.28.7-8.

Scipio's discussion of the actions of the troops at Rhegium does not rely on the usual commonplaces about soldierly irrationality and depravity that we find in other accounts, but rather attempts to consider the episode from the point of view of the men involved. In Scipio's retelling of the incident at Rhegium, the soldiers take rational and coordinated action to protect and advance their own interests. We should, however, be cautious of concluding that Scipio's speech offers an accurate assessment of what motivated the soldiers at Rhegium to take action. The speech does not represent either the actual words that Scipio used on this occasion nor a critical historical analysis of the behavior of the soldiers at Rhegium. The speech was a Livian creation aimed, in part, at conveying what the historian deemed most appropriate for the particular historical actor in the particular historical moment.[25] Nor should we lose sight of the fact that the speech also served Livy's larger literary agenda. By recalling and commenting on an event that Livy had referred to earlier in his work, the historian was entering into an internal discourse within his work on the purpose and value of examples from the past. The framing of Rhegium as a historical *exemplum* marks the discussion of the soldiers and their motivations as part of a larger dialogue that, as scholars like Chaplin and Roller have shown in detail, stretches across the entirety of Livy's work.[26]

0.1: A Social Historical Approach to the Armies of the Republic

Regardless of its value as a historical document about the actions of the soldiers at Rhegium, Scipio's speech evinces an important reality about Roman armies more generally.[27] His description of the incident at Rhegium, not to mention the fact that the speech is delivered in the context of a mutiny of his own troops as a result of payments long in arrears, reveals that Roman armies and the soldiers that comprised them had concerns beyond their military duties and that they were more than capable of taking action to ensure that these concerns were addressed. The image that Scipio presents

25 While providing what seems to be a generous explanation of the incident at Rhegium, in this same scene, Livy casts aspersions at the indolence and greed of the soldiers who mutinied at Sucro.

26 Chaplin 2000; Roller 2018.

27 See Chapter 7, pp. 241-242 for a fuller discussion of the incident at Rhegium.

coincides with the tranche of scholarly work over the last sixty years that has demonstrated incontrovertibly that Roman armies and the men that comprised them did much more than just "wage war." Indeed, in the wake of the horrific loss of life in the World Wars and amidst constant fear of another large scale conflict during the Cold War, scholars of Roman armies began to transfer their focus away from traditional studies of tactics, strategy, and operations.[28] As a part of a larger academic movement known as New Military History, these scholars set out to study in detail the lives and experiences of men on campaign as well as how these realities transformed Roman society on a local and global level.[29] Discoveries in epigraphy, archaeology, and papyrology which provide explicit evidence about the lives of these men who fought in Rome's army, and the application of sociological frameworks to this new evidence has brought about a complete change in understanding of the Roman military.[30] Such studies, to quote Simon James, have transformed soldiers to "social agents, not robots, men with their own values, aspirations, families, and social networks beyond their regiments" whose actions and interests shaped the history of the Mediterranean world.[31] Recognizing Roman troops as agents with connections to broader society changes our understanding of Roman military forces. No longer can we hold that the Roman military writ large was a "machine." Rather, Roman military forces should be seen as dynamic social organisms that shaped and were shaped by the various worlds they inhabited. These forces were agents capable of protecting and advancing their own social, economic, and political interests even in the face of opposition from the state's structures of power.

There is, however, one aspect of Scipio's description of the army at Rhegium that does not fit well with the research on Roman forces discussed above: the time period. Works emphasizing that Roman soldiers and armies were dynamic and powerful social forces rather than implements of war have, by and large, focused on the armies from the Imperial period. Simply put, Roman forces from the third century BCE, like the ones that took over Rhegium during the Pyrrhic war and rebelled against Scipio at Sucro, do not

28 For a detailed historiography of the Roman Imperial army as well as the epistemological problems presented by traditional approaches, see James 2002, 1-50.

29 Lendon 2004, 441-449 traces the rise of social historical approaches in the study of the Roman army within the context of other trends in historical scholarships.

30 See Chapter 1, pp. 39-41 for a more detailed discussion of these scholarly trends.

31 James 2002, 42.

figure in the larger scholarly discussion about Roman armies as dynamic sites of interaction and agency.[32] There are two major reasons for the absence of Roman forces from the Republic from this scholarly discourse. The first is evidentiary. The plenitude of epigraphic and archaeological evidence from the Imperial period that pertains to Roman soldiers and the units and armies they served in simply does not exist for the Republic. Though the work of archaeologists in Spain, France, and other places in the Mediterranean is starting to correct this imbalance, the type of work that historians of the Roman Empire have been able to do in excavating the social *realia* of the Imperial army has, to put it bluntly, not really been possible for the armies of the Republic. The second major reason for the absence of Republican forces from these kinds of studies seems to be the belief of some scholars that the frameworks used to study the armies of the Empire would simply not be applicable for their earlier counterparts. For example, A. D. Lee has stated that adoption of the framework of community would be "largely irrelevant" for the Republic "since the legions traditionally comprised part-time soldiers who undertook military service during each year's campaigning season, in between periods of farming their land."[33] Armies raised and dismissed seasonally would, in Lee's view, not be able to form the kinds of social bonds nor impact the peoples and places where they campaigned in the same ways that the professional standing armies of the Imperial period did in the centuries after the fall of the Republic.

This present volume positions itself in response to this particular nexus of issues in scholarship. Through a close examination of the military forces of third and second century BCE, this book argues that thinking of the Roman forces of the Republic as spaces for interaction and agency is valid, possible, and, most importantly, a valuable historiographical operation.[34] At the heart

32 Exceptions to this general rule: Taylor 2017; 2020c. There have been some attempts to bring armies from other periods of the Republic into these social historical frameworks. Armstrong 2016b, 101-119 attempts to develop a conception of military cohesion for the archaic period using social psychology. Brice 2003; de Blois 2007, 164-179; Keaveney 2007, 9-35, 71-92; Brice 2020a; 2020b have stressed the power and agency of armies during the Late Republic.

33 Lee 2020, 114.

34 As a shorthand, I will at times refer to this period as the Middle Republic. As Flower 2010, 24-28 notes, the Middle Republic is traditionally defined as beginning sometime between 367 and 264 BCE and ending at latest by 100 BCE. For a new and more dynamic

of this scholarly intervention is the claim that over the course of these two centuries, the nature of military service transformed Roman forces into dynamic social entities much like their later imperial counterparts. Far from rag-tag citizen-soldier militias engaged in short-term campaigns, the armies of the third and second centuries were diverse groups, consisting not just of citizen-soldiers, but also allied forces from Italy and beyond as well as a large coterie of non-military personnel, that traversed the Mediterranean world on multi-year campaigns in support of the Republic's imperial endeavors. What's more, these troops were not hermetically sealed behind the walls of Roman military camps – they interacted and formed relationships with the inhabitants of the places in which they served as well. Following from these observations, it is thus a central contention of this book that armies of the period served as essential sites of interaction between different groups of people in Rome's burgeoning empire, including but not limited to citizens and allies, conquerors and conquered, free and enslaved peoples, and women and men. Put another way, the Roman forces and the connections and interactions they developed during the third and second centuries BCE were essential to the making and shaping of Rome's Mediterranean empire.

The other major claim of the work is that the connections and interactions that Roman troops had in this period gave them real power and agency. Not only did the bonds that developed between men who served together empower them to take collective action to protect and advance their own interests, but the systems and structures of the armies of this period, with their focus on promoting internal cohesion on the battlefield, gave them a powerful toolkit for doing so. This assertion is substantiated by the frequency of resistance and disobedience on the part of Roman forces in this period. The various mutinies, conspiracies, desertions, and instances of disobedience that Roman forces took part in reveal the significant influence that they could exert on various structures of power throughout the Roman world to advance their economic, social, and political interests. Moreover, the diversity of individuals involved meant that the impacts of these actions were wide-ranging. They were not just felt at Rome; they reshaped the economic, social, and political landscapes of the entire Mediterranean during the third and second centuries BCE. In making these two claims, this work makes a significant contribution to the

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reading of the Middle Republic, with broader chronological and methodological scopes, see Bernard and Padilla Peralta 2022. See pp. 23-28 for further discussion of my choice to focus on the third and second centuries.

understanding of the Roman military in this period by offering a corrective to the traditional perception of armies of the third and second centuries as defined by discipline and patriotic devotion to the Roman state.[35]

Beyond advancing our understanding of the army of the third and second centuries, this study also makes contributions to several broader aspects of Republican history as well. As a work of social history, it contributes to and fits in with a spate of recent scholarship on the Middle Republic that is radically transforming how we conceptualize this crucial period of Roman history. These works, which are driven in tandem by new archaeological evidence and a desire to decenter the aristocratic elite, have drawn attention to the lives of various non-elite groups such as slaves, foreigners, women, and laborers and shown how such groups drove literary, religious, and architectural innovation within it.[36] In addition to the contributions that this work makes to the study of non-elite actors in the Middle Republic, it also builds on recent studies of popular power in the Roman Republic that emphasize how such power was actuated beyond and, at times, in contravention of traditional institutional pathways.[37] Roman troops were able to use their ability to act collectively as well as their broad-ranging social networks to challenge the power of the Roman aristocratic elite beyond the ballot box. By highlighting the power and frequency of these actions, this project sheds new light on the long-standing debate about the political character of the Roman Republic.[38] The powerful yet temporary nature of many of the interventions made by Roman troops suggests that the framing of the current debate about the political character of the Republic requires a recalibration in terms of the way it conceptualizes popular power.

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35 Claims about the discipline and patriotism of the Roman Republican army are deeply embedded in the scholarship of the topic, drawing largely from Polybius' discussion in Book 6 and stories from the Roman annalistic tradition preserved by Livy. For some examples of the prominent place that these ideas hold in scholarship, see Nicolet 1980, 105-109; Keppie 1984, 38; Horsmann 1991, 1-4; Peddie 1994; Southern 2007, 145-147; Hölkeskamp 2010, 175-179; Brand 2019.

36 Slaves: Stewart 2012; Richlin 2017; Padilla Peralta 2017, 317-369; Čulík-Baird 2019, 174-197. Foreigners: Isayev 2017; Padilla Peralta 2020a, 203-227. Women: Schultz 2006; DiLuzio 2016; Flower 2018, 252-263; Padilla Peralta 2020a, 186-202. Laborers: Bernard 2018; Mogetta 2021.

37 Courrier 2014; Rosillo-López, 2017; Jewell 2019, 1-41; Rosillo-López, 2022.

38 E.g. Millar 1984, 1-19; 1986, 1-11; 1989, 138-150; North 1990, 277-287; Pina Polo 1996; Yakobson 1999; Hölkeskamp 2000, 203-223; Mouritsen 2001; Flaig 2003; Morstein-Marx 2004; Hölkeskamp 2010.

The study also speaks to the question of Rome's relationship with recently conquered people during the Republic. The complexity that emerges from this study allows us to move beyond categorizing these relationships as either breeding enmity or serving as a mechanism for integration.[39] We see that non-Roman troops used military service to advance their economic, social, and political goals, goals that were sometimes aligned with that of the Roman state and at other times directly opposed to it. As to the former, the project expands on recent research that has highlighted service in the Roman army as a means of economic and social advancement in Italy by incorporating auxiliary soldiers into this narrative.[40] I demonstrate that service in the Roman armies created new economic opportunities as well as new forms of socio-political capital in Hispania, Greece, and Asia Minor in the second century BCE. As to the latter, my focus on instances of disobedience and insubordination highlights how military service proved a fertile ground for resistance, as it not only brought ruler and ruled together, but also empowered the oppressed group to take collective action. These observations put my project in dialogue with recent work that has sought to establish more firmly the place of resistance and rebellion in the Roman world.[41]

0.2: Periodizing Roman Armies

Before discussing the method and approach that I will use to substantiate these claims, there are two preliminaries that must be addressed. The first of these is the vexed question of periodization and, more particularly, why I have chosen the third and second centuries as the chronological bounds of this study. As Harriet Flower has demonstrated quite clearly in *Roman Republics*, periodization is an important intellectual project with significant consequences. Flower shows that the use of terms like "the Republic" to describe the political systems of the Roman state used over the period of five centuries not only creates the idea of a monolithic and static historical entity, but smooths over the dynamic process

39 Pfeilschifter 2007, 27-42 (cf. Mouritsen 2001).

40 Italian advancement via military service: Rosenstein 2012; Kay 2014; Roselaar 2019. Auxiliary troops in the Republic: Hamdoune 1999; Prag 2007, 68-100; 2010, 101-113; 2011, 15-28; 2015, 281-294; Gauthier 2020, 283-296.

41 For recent work on rebellion in the ancient world, see Urbainczyk 2008; Gambash 2015; Lavan 2017, 19-38; Machado 2020, 229-255.

of historical change.[42] To that end, Flower proposes breaking "the Republic" into six different republics, each of which is defined by changes in political praxis ushered in by legislative reform.[43] While this periodization offers a novel way of viewing the Republic, John North has noted that Flower has prioritized politics and political change in defining the different eras and argued that there well may be other ways to periodize the Republic depending on the category of analysis applied.[44] The dialogue between Flower and North offers a useful paradigm for periodization for this project.[45] Following from North's critique, I have chosen not to use Flower's schema of republics for my own work quite simply because Roman military systems did not move in lock-step with Roman political praxis. But while Flower's chronology is not suitable for a discussion of Roman military systems, I have nevertheless tried to use her heuristic of historical continuity and change in thinking about how periodization works for this particular project and its interests.

There are a number of changes at the start of the third century that point to it as the beginning of a new period of Roman military history.[46] First, the period around the turn of the third century saw a massive increase in the amount of manpower available to the Romans. After Rome's victory in the Great Latin War in 338, the Roman state granted citizenship in various forms to the people of Latium, rendering them liable for military service. The decades that followed saw the Roman state expand their manpower base even further. In addition to granting citizenship to a number of neighboring peoples like the Hernici and Sabines, the Romans also brokered alliances with various Italic city-states which required them to provide military support when asked.[47] So effective was Rome's newfound means of expanding its military manpower that Polybius could claim that on eve of the war with the Celts in 225 BCE the Roman state had 770,000 soldiers, citizens, and allies, who were capable of bearing arms.[48] While the accuracy of Polybius' claim has

42 Flower 2010, 6-15.

43 For the schema and justification, see Flower 2010, 18-34.

44 North 2010, 469-472.

45 Cf. Padilla Peralta 2020a, 11 for the usefulness of reading North and Flower in conjunction with one another.

46 Armstrong 2020, 76-79 offers a clear summary of these arguments.

47 On *civitas sine suffragio*, see recently Ando 2016, 175-179; Tan 2020, 60-65; Sisani 2021, 95-148.

48 Polyb. 2.24 (cf. Taylor 2020a, 27-34; Pearson 2021, 62-70 for analysis and the vast bibliography about this particular notice).

been hotly debated, the larger point that he was trying to convey is certainly correct – the Roman system of citizenship and alliance allowed the state to conscribe and deploy massive armies in the aftermath of these changes. Over the course of the third and second centuries, the Roman military system could raise in excess of ten legions and the commensurate number of allies whenever it needed to.

Coincident with this ability to conscript increasingly large numbers of soldiers was a change in the geographic scope of Roman military operations. While Rome's wars in fifth and fourth centuries were primarily fought against its neighbors in central Italy, the first half of the third century saw the state using its new sources of manpower far beyond these immediate confines. Rome sent forces all over the Italic peninsula, from Bruttium in the South to the furthest reaches of Etruria and Picenum in the North, completing the conquest of the entirety of Italy by 264. Simultaneous with the Roman conquest of Italy in this period were two other events that opened the doors to the possibility of warfare outside of the peninsula. The first was the invasion of the Italic peninsula by Pyrrhus of Epirus in 280, an event that brought Rome into sustained conflict with a power outside of Italy for the first time. This war saw the Romans band together not just with various Italic peoples to oppose Pyrrhus, but with Carthage as well. The interactions that Rome had with Carthage throughout the war, including the contentious siege of Tarentum in 272, set the stage for our second major event. The decision to go to war with Carthage in 264 marked the first time that Roman armies left the Italic peninsula. Whatever the motivation was in this particular case, it was a moment from which the Romans never looked back. For the next two centuries, the deployment of soldiers outside of Italy for the purpose of fighting a foreign enemy was not the exception, but the rule.

Concurrent with the transformation of the scope and scale of Roman warfare were a number of tactical changes. The most prominent of these was the replacement of the phalanx that had dominated Italic warfare in centuries prior with the manipular legion.[49] Rather than employing a large massed front, the manipular legion instead deployed a number of smaller units (*manipuli*) with gaps between in a checkerboard fashion. Though debate remains about the exact circumstances that brought about the adoption of

49 Other changes include the adoption of new Celtic weaponry including the *pilum* and *scutum*, on which see Armstrong 2017, 65-74; Taylor 2020c, 31-65.

the maniple, modern scholars and ancient sources generally agree that the shift must have occurred at some point in the late fourth century BCE.[50] We find evidence of manipular tactics being used by Roman forces already in accounts of battles in the early third century.[51] As was the case with changes in recruitment and the geographic range of Roman warfare, these changes were not ephemeral. Polybius lauds the maniple as a key tactical advantage that enabled the Romans to defeat the Hellenistic forces that they faced in Greece and Asia Minor in the second century.

These changes in the early third century, as numerous scholars have noted, not only altered the operation of Roman military forces in the short term, but came to define Roman warfare over next two centuries. But in addition to fashioning a new and different way of war, these changes are meaningful to our present study because they fundamentally changed the ways in which the men who served in Roman military forces interacted with one another. The expansion of manpower to include not just people from the city of Rome, but people from all over Italy made Roman military forces something of a laboratory of empire, brokering interactions between peoples of different statuses and cultures within Rome's growing imperial realm. Roman *cives*, Latin *cives sine suffragio*, *socii* from Campania, and recently conquered Samnites not only fought side-by-side, but lived and worked in close proximity with one another. What's more, the increasing geographic scope of warfare meant, as we shall see in Chapter 1, that campaigns became increasingly protracted and thus provided more time for troops to interact and develop connections with one another. The increasingly far-flung nature of Roman warfare also brought these troops into contact with new peoples and places. Even the tactical changes alluded to influenced the social realities of men serving in Roman military forces. As I will describe in full detail in Chapter 2, the maniple regulated the way that troops were housed within the camp and thus shaped how and when they interacted with each other. Moreover, manipular tactics, as I discuss in Chapter 4, were predicated on empowering units to take collective actions that they saw fit. The encouragement that the system provided for men to work together and make decisions of their own accord on the battlefield created new pathways for action beyond prescribed military activities as well.

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50 For different views on the adoption of the maniple, compare Taylor 2020b, 38-56 with Armstrong 2020, 84-89.

51 Taylor 2020b, 39-40 (cf. Plut. *Pyr*. 21.6; Polyb. 1.33-34).

When did this period initiated by the series of reforms enacted at the turn of the third century end? All of the aforementioned structures were very much still in place when Polybius was writing in the middle of the second century.[52] The Roman legions, consisting of a mix of both citizen-soldiers and allies, operating with manipular tactics, and deployed to all corners of the globe described above not only seem *au courant* to the Greek historian, but are central to his vision of Rome's military systems. In the decades following the completion of Polybius' work, however, it is clear that things were beginning to change. After the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146, the extent of Roman warmaking slowed considerably. Similarly, archaeological evidence from late second century Hispania seems to suggest that Roman tactics may have started to move away from the maniple.[53] Furthermore, some scholars have argued that this period saw a significant change in the demographics of Roman armies, as a result of what appears to be steadily declining property requirements for military service.[54] But it is ultimately difficult, due in part to the nature of our literary sources for the late second century, to evaluate the larger importance of these changes. It is unclear, for example, whether the shift to cohort-based warfare was a peculiarity of Hispania or a broader phenomenon. Similarly, it is hard to ascertain whether the notices of the reductions in property requirements in our sources were just one-off measures or more permanent ones.[55]

It rather seems that the turn of the first century offers a more definitive dividing line.[56] A number of changes that occurred in the first two decades of the first century marked a major departure from the way of warfare that defined the two centuries prior, in the process altering the social dynamics of Roman military forces that are central to this book. One such change was the granting of citizenship to all Italic peoples at the end of the Social War in 89 BCE. The grant of citizenship to the allies fundamentally altered the key aspect of the way in which the armies of the prior period were organized. Indeed, the legislation erased the distinction between citizen and allied soldiers that was so prominent in the armies of the third and second centuries. From that point forward, all

52 Rawson 1971, 13-31; Dobson 2008 provides the most comprehensive overviews of Polybius' treatment of the Roman army in Book 6.

53 Bell 1965, 404-422; Dobson 2008, 408-410; Taylor 2019, 81.

54 E.g. Brunt 1971, 75-77; 402-408; Gabba 1976, 1-19.

55 Rich 1983, 310-316; Gauthier 2016, 105-108; Cadiou 2018 *passim*.

56 Clark 2014, 14-15 offers a similar suggestion in terms of the beginning of the first century as the end-point of an era of Roman war-making (though she differs in the starting point).

troops recruited from the Italian peninsula served as legionary soldiers. This change smoothed over some of the critical complexities and tensions – the franchised conquerors fighting alongside, but simultaneously privileged over the disenfranchised conquered – that defined the social dynamics of the forces of the third and second century. The granting of citizenship to all peoples of the Italic peninsula also changed the composition of Roman armies. Since there was no longer a need to recruit soldiers from the city of Rome and its environs, the army became overwhelming Italic, that is non-Roman, in origin.

This shift in composition appears to have been accompanied by a shift in tactics as well. The cohort, originally an administrative unit used to organize the Italian allies, and not the maniple was now the primary tactical unit of the Roman army.[57] The adoption of the cohort meant different configurations of soldiers, both within the Roman camp and in the field, creating new ways in which men within the army interacted with one another and new possibilities of collective action. Last but not least, the types of wars that Roman soldiers fought in during the first century were different than the centuries prior. While Roman military forces were still being deployed for the purpose of imperial expansion in places like Gaul and Asia Minor, the outbreak of the Social War in 90 and the eruption of civil war between Marius and Sulla in 88 ushered in a sixty-year period that was defined by internecine conflict. These wars shifted the political, social, economic, and demographic landscape of the Mediterranean world to such a degree that institutions and practices that developed in this crucible and its aftermath could not but be different from what came before it.

0.3: Roman Military Forces in the Third and Second Centuries

Now that we have established the chronological setting for our investigation, let us move onto our second and final preliminary: a brief description of Roman military forces in the period. Since the units that composed Roman military forces in the period will take center stage in the present work, briefly discussing their composition and organization will help us to understand better the main actors in our narrative as well as the various plots and subplots in which they were enmeshed.

57 Taylor 2019, 81-82.

As mentioned above, the armies that feature in this book largely coincide with the aforementioned manipular army described by Polybius in Book 6 of the *Histories*. At the heart of the armies of this period were land-owning Roman citizens. As Polybius records, Roman citizens who met the property requirements and were of age were called to levy in the Campus Martius prior to every campaign.[58] The chosen soldiers were enrolled in legions, roughly 4,000 to 6,000 in strength, and assigned to one of three heavy infantry lines: the *hastati*, the *principes*, and the *triarii*.[59] Each of these lines were subdivided into maniples that consisted of 120 men in the case of the *hastati* and *principes* and 60 in the case of the *triarii*. Accompanying these heavy infantry units were light armed forces, known as *velites*. The *velites*, who were, according to Polybius, the youngest and poorest of the men enrolled in the legion, did not belong to their own company, but were divided equally among the three lines of heavy infantry.[60] The infantry was joined by a complement of 300 *equites* or cavalry, who were divided into ten *turmae* consisting of thirty men each.[61] Roman cavalrymen, as both Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus note, were drawn from citizens with the highest census rating and thus represented the wealthiest Roman citizens in the army.[62]

The legion of citizen-soldiers deployed were supplemented by massive numbers of non-Roman troops. Our sources suggest that, beginning in the late fourth century, individual Italic states allied to Rome contributed troops to Rome's military endeavors. At first, the contingents were organized on an *ad hoc* basis and, as such, these units were of varying size and operated under the command of local leaders.[63] However, the requirements of the Second Punic War – the constant fighting, the multiple arenas of war, the massive loss of

58 Polyb. 6.19-20 (cf. Pearson 2021, 17-27 for commentary on this passage).

59 There is significant controversy over the number of soldiers in a legion in this period (cf. Sumner 1970, 67-70; Brunt 1971, 672-675; Roth 1994, 347; Pearson 2021, 39-41). Polyb. 3.107.10 claims that the standard size of the legion is 4,200, but the count from Polyb. 6.21.10 suggests something more to the effect of 4,500. From Livy's accounts of the Second Punic War, legions seem to be about 5,000 in strength and he later mentions at 44.21.8 a legionary strength of 6,000.

60 Polyb. 6.21.7.

61 Polyb. 6.25.1-2.

62 Cic. *Rep*. 2.39; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 4.18.1.

63 Some examples of these *ad hoc* Italian bands in the earlier part of the third century BCE: the Samnite Herius Potilius and 4,000 men (Zon. 8.11; Oros. *Hist*. 4.7.12) and Oblacus Volsinius and his group of Frentanian soldiers at the battle of Heraclea (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 19.12; Plut. *Pyrr*. 16.8-10).

life as well as the new ambitions that it inspired – led to the formalization of the role of the Italian allies (*socii*) within the Roman army.[64] By the end of the third century, the number of troops that each allied community was expected to contribute was concretely defined and, as Polybius attests, these troops were placed under the control of a Roman commander and given a place within the Roman camp.[65] From this point forward, allied infantrymen were, at least, as numerous in Roman armies as their citizen counterparts, while the number of allied cavalrymen was usually more than double that of the *equites*.[66]

Socii were not the only non-Roman soldiers who served Roman military forces. The Roman armies of this period also relied heavily on troops who hailed from outside the Italic peninsula. These troops, sometimes referred to in our sources as *auxilia externa*, were often but not always recruited locally in support of Roman military efforts in a particular region. As was the case initially with the *socii*, these troops served under the command of local potentates who had aligned themselves with Rome.[67] These troops performed a wide variety of roles in support of the Roman armies of the period. These units, for instance, served in local garrisons, protected important trade routes, and provided numerical reinforcement on the battlefield.[68] Additionally, certain auxiliary units were recruited for their expertises; we know that the Romans employed Numidian cavalry or Balearic slingers quite simply because they were regarded as particularly skilled soldiers.[69]

Though the vast majority of what follows will focus on the armies of the Middle Republic, we will also at certain times speak of the men who served in Roman naval forces as well. Though the exact origins of Roman naval power remain a topic of significant debate, recent years has seen the development of

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64 Frederiksen 1984, 224-230; Kent 2012, 99-106.

65 The contribution requirements for allied towns are often referred to in modern scholarship as the *formula togatorum*, but the phrase only exists in one place, line 21 of the *lex Agraria* of 111: *socii nominisve Latini quibus ex formula togatorum milites in terra Italia inperare solent* (cf. CIL I² 585, Crawford 1996, 113-180 for the whole inscription). There are, however, a handful of references in Livy to *formulae* related to conscription (e.g. Livy 22.57.10, 27.10.2). For more on such practices, see Mommsen 1881, 3.672-676; Brunt 1971, 545-548; Lo Cascio 1994, 309-328.

66 Polyb. 6.26.7, 6.30.2 (cf. Rich 1983, 323-324; de Ligt 2007, 117).

67 Prag 2010, 101-113.

68 Cf. Prag 2007, 70-80 for compilation of the ancient evidence.

69 Numidian cavalry (e.g.): Livy 27.5.6-7, 32.29, 38.41; Frontin. *Str.* 1.5.16 (cf. Horsted 2021, 8-10). Balearic slingers (e.g.): Livy 38.29.5; Frontin. *Str.* 4.7.27.

a consensus that the Roman state had some nascent form of naval operations by the end of the fourth century BCE.[70] By the end of the First Punic War, however, the situation had changed – Rome not only had a navy as large as Carthage, their more seaworthy rival, but they were capable of maintaining it as well. As scholars like Steinby have shown, these forces were crucial to Roman success in a number of wars that followed.[71] While we have some knowledge of Roman naval operations as a whole in the third and second centuries, we do not know much about the hundreds of thousands of men who served in the Roman navy in this period. The brief anecdotes that we do have mention a number of different groups who served in the Roman navy, with varying degrees of frequency. As the use of the term *socii navales* to describe the crew of Roman fleets suggests, the vast majority of the men who served in Rome's navy were likely of Italian origin. Scholars have posited that the Romans also probably relied particularly on Italian coastal towns to outfit their navy because such places would have likely had stronger sailors.[72] Along similar lines, the *coloniae maritimae*, a set of citizen colonies established along the coast of the Tyrrhenian sea in the fourth and third centuries, also supplied crews for Roman fleets during this period.[73] Freeborn Roman citizens, apart from those recruited from *coloniae maritimae*, occasionally served in the navy, as did Roman freedmen and slaves particularly in times of need.[74] In addition to the boats that the Romans built and manned themselves, it is worth noting that Roman naval forces consisted of auxiliary units as well. In these situations, the communities contributing the ships likely also outfitted them with a crew made up of local recruits.[75]

0.4: Methodology, Sources, and Outline

Now that we have identified the argument, setting, and *dramatis personae* of this study, let us now plot out how the rest of the work will proceed. In addition to laying out the structure of the present study, I want, in particular,

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70 Steinby 2007, 29-84; Pitassi 2011, 69-89.

71 Steinby 2007, 108-219 details the importance that naval warfare played in Roman warfare between the Second Punic War and the Third Macedonian War.

72 Thiel 1954, 32, 74; Goldsworthy 2003, 34.

73 Salmon 1963, 3-33; Mason 1992, 75-87.

74 On *proletarii* as rowers, see Brunt 1971, 65; Rosenstein 2002, 170-172. On freedman being called up for naval service, see Welwei 1988, 28-44; Mouritsen 2011, 71-72. On the use of galley-slaves during the Second Punic War, see Libourel 1973, 116-119 (cf. Thiel 1946, 196-198).

75 Thiel 1954, 73.

to flag the methodologies and sources that I will employ therein. As discussed above, there is a relative paucity of evidence for the third and second centuries in comparison to later periods and, as such, I want to gesture at how I intend to deal with these evidentiary limitations. Such gesturing, however, will be preliminary rather than comprehensive, as I have reserved more detailed discussions of the methodologies that I employ as well as my approach to source material *in situ*.

The book can be broadly divided into two parts. The first part, which consists of the first three chapters of this book, aims to demonstrate that Rome's military forces in the third and second centuries were dynamic social entities. These chapters are not only united by the topic that they pursue, but also by a shared approach. Borrowing the theoretical framework that scholars have used so productively to understand the social dynamics of military forces of the Imperial period over the past forty years, these chapters examine the armies of the third and second century as communities. Using this heuristic, these chapters chart the connections that Roman troops of this period developed within and beyond the walls of the camp while on campaign. In addition to drawing our attention to the range of people that Roman troops in this period interacted with, the chapters also zero in on the various factors that mediated and shaped these interactions.

Chapter 1 ("Middle Republican Armies as Communities") argues that, contrary to objections of Lee discussed above, the forces of the Middle Republic can and should be considered communities much like their Imperial counterparts. The chapter begins with an analysis of how the armies of the period constituted what sociologists have termed natural communities. The increasing length of campaigns in the third and second centuries BCE as well as the configuration of Roman camps meant that the men who served in these forces lived and worked in close proximity to one another for a number of years. Moreover, these men also participated in shared rituals and interacted with one another in a number of communal spaces in the Roman camp as well. But it was not just the fact that these men inhabited the same spaces and took part in the activities that fostered a sense of community in these forces. Rather, I contend that these forces can be understood as ideological communities as well. Indeed, the spaces, hierarchies, and relations of Roman armies in this period were modeled on and compared to preexisting ideas of community such the *polis* and *familia*. These metaphors provided an additional level of depth to the connections that formed as a result of the more "natural" aspects of Roman military service throughout the period,

ultimately bringing together a diverse group of soldiers from a wide variety of social, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.

In Chapter 2 ("Unit Identity"), I expand on the discussion in the previous chapter by examining the bonds that formed between soldiers at the unit level. The chapter begins with a look at the connections that developed among citizen-soldiers serving in the same maniple. Using a combination of numismatic and literary evidence, I argue that the maniple served as an important repository of identity for the soldiers who served in them. The sense of shared identity was not only fostered through the constant interactions between men serving in the same maniple, but also by a clearly articulated ideology that centered on the manipular standard. The second half of the chapter draws on a mixture of art historical, epigraphic, and literary evidence to analyze units consisting of allied and auxiliary soldiers. I contend that allied and auxiliary units, much like their citizen-soldier counterparts, possessed a strong sense of collective identity. This, however, was not only due to the close quarters in which soldiers from the same unit worked, but also because these units tended to be organized by ethnicity. Men serving in an allied cohort or auxiliary detachment shared not just the same experiences of warfare, but a language, culture, and history as well. A key point that emerges throughout this chapter is that the strength of these unit level bonds worked simultaneously to support and challenge the larger superstructures of the armies in this period. On one hand, the sense of cohesion made these units powerful and resilient fighting forces. On the other hand, the strength of unit level bonds created the possibility of resistance and conflict when the goals of the unit did not align with those of the army.

The connections that Roman troops made beyond the walls of the camp during the third and second centuries are the topic of Chapter 3 ("Connections Beyond the *Castra*"). The chapter begins with a discussion of Scipio Aemilianus' actions at Numantia in 134 BCE, in which the famed general kicked out all non-military personnel from the Roman camp. While scholars have focused primarily on the episode as indicative of Roman military discipline, I use this scene as a starting point for investigating the wide variety of non-military personnel in and around Roman camps in the context of a mobile Mediterranean world. The chapter then traces the evidence for interactions between Roman soldiers in this period and the three groups of people that Scipio allegedly kicked out of the camp at Numantia: slaves and merchants, women, and religious personnel. Though our literary record is not particularly forthcoming about these interactions, the few

anecdotes that we possess, when combined with archaeological discoveries and comparative evidence from the Hellenistic period, paint a vivid picture of the connections that Roman troops built beyond the camp walls while on campaign. What emerges is that military forces in the Middle Republic were hardly the cloistered and monastic institutions that scholars have long perceived them to be. Rather, they were actively developing connections and building communities with peoples from all over the Mediterranean world.

Chapter 4 ("From Community to Collective Action") is the fulcrum on which the book pivots. It argues that the nature of Roman military service enabled and prepared Roman soldiers to take collective action to protect and advance their interests. Drawing on insights from Social Identity Theory, I contend that the sense of community that developed in Roman forces primed them to take collective action. The priming of troops for collective endeavors was reinforced by the nature of the tactics and strategies that Roman armies employed in the field. Manipular tactics, in particular, depended on the ability to take part in coordinated collective action and thus served to regularize such behavior and give troops practice enacting it. To demonstrate the extent to which Roman soldiers were empowered to act collectively, I highlight how Roman armies were able to reorganize in the absence of a commander by examining the recovery efforts after Cannae and the defeat of the Scipiones in Hispania during the Second Punic War. After addressing some deterrents that may have countervailed against these incentives to collective action, the chapter then moves on to consider the frequency with which such action occurred. Through a close interrogation of the biases and gaps of our historical record, I contend that the evidence we do have suggests that soldiers took forms of mass collective action to protect their own interests rather frequently in the third and second centuries BCE. The final part of the chapter attempts to locate my discussion of collective action within a larger theoretical framework of popular power articulated by Dipesh Chakrabarthy in order to move beyond problematic presuppositions about the nature of popular movements in modern scholarship.

Drawing on the theoretical frameworks laid out in Chapter 4, the second part of the book argues that Roman forces during this period were able to act collectively to advance their own interests and that such actions shaped the social, economic, and political realities of the worlds they inhabited. Military service gave those serving in and associated with Roman military forces in the period the tools needed to take collective action as well as direct access to structures of power. The actions that resulted from this confluence

were quite varied in their aims and goals and naturally dependent on the interest of the people involved. Some of these actions were advanced within sanctioned institutional frameworks, while others directly challenged Roman structures of power. What emerges through these four chapters, in spite of the significant diversity in the forms, motivations, and actors involved, however, is that Roman military service offered a space for the exercise of collective popular power in a number of arenas across the Mediterranean world.

In Chapter 5 ("Material Benefits and Economic Agency"), I consider how Roman troops protected and advanced their economic interests while on campaign. At the heart of this investigation is a discussion of the role that they played in acquisition and distribution of booty. In addition to showing that soldiers were given a crucial role in the licit processes by which *praeda* was gathered and shared, I contend that soldiers seem to have rather frequently requisitioned booty when they were expressly instructed not to. Not only could such acts of disobedience not be stopped, but they were rarely punished. As a result, soldiers, both citizens and non-citizens, gained real power over a financial resource that was, as recent scholarship has shown, of utmost importance to the Roman state in this period. This chapter then moves on to consider other ways that Roman troops used collective action to ensure that they received the material benefits they were promised such as the *stipendium* and food rations. The chapter concludes by showing how non-military personnel, particularly merchants and traders, leveraged the connections that they developed with Roman military forces to further their economic interests as well.

The ways in which military service enabled troops to perform and advance their social status during this period are considered in Chapter 6 ("Status and Soldiering"). The chapter begins with a discussion of how warfare provided an opportunity for social advancement for enslaved people through a close examination of the story of the *volones* during the Second Punic War. Through this case study of the *volones*, I highlight the ways in which the opportunities and connections afforded by Roman military service provided troops with a means for social advancement, even in the face of strong political, cultural, and legal opposition. In the next section, I draw from a cache of honorific inscriptions to demonstrate how non-Roman soldiers took collective action to claim that their service in Roman armies was something worthy of public commemoration. These inscriptions show how the dedicators simultaneously drew on the privileged place of martial excellence in the Hellenistic world and the power and success of Rome within this world to lay collective claim

to social prominence. The chapter concludes by investigating how Roman citizen-soldiers used collective action not for social advancement, but to counter attempts by Roman institutions to strip them of their social standing. By relating how different groups of Roman citizen-soldiers responded to threats to their social status, I show how collective action provided troops with a tool to challenge the social domination of the Roman senatorial aristocracy.

The next two chapters take on question of the political power of Roman soldiers during this period. Chapter 7 ("Politics: Local and Global") demonstrates that the Roman military service provided a venue for non-Romans to take politically-oriented action. It demonstrates that structural features of Roman warfare in the third and second centuries created opportunities for non-Roman troops to engage in various acts of collective disobedience like desertion, defection, and betrayal. These actions allowed non-Roman soldiers to insert themselves into larger political conversations. On the global level, these actions represented a form of resistance against Rome's burgeoning imperial power. Such acts challenged Roman hegemony by taking advantage of Roman overreliance on newly conquered people for manpower. At the same time, these acts of collective disobedience served local purposes as well. Defection and desertion allowed certain polities to take on their rivals and gave them the opportunity to remake the power dynamics at a local level. But this was not the only way in which Roman military forces during this period fundamentally altered the politics of empire. Using the story of the *hybridae* from Hispania as a case study, the last part of this chapter shows how local peoples who developed connections with Roman soldiers made use of them to reconfigure local and provincial politics. These observations, when considered together and in light of what we have seen in earlier chapters, reveal the different ways in which Roman military service mediated the relationship between conqueror and conquered.

My final chapter, Chapter 8 ("Domestic Politics"), argues that the collective abilities of Roman soldiers also granted them substantial political power at Rome. Using the rejection of Aemilius Paullus' triumph as a case study, I demonstrate how soldiers could use their shared experiences, their significant numbers, and their broad social connections to affect political matters of the highest order. I highlight two areas in particular where soldiers repeatedly and decisively brought about political change using these strategic advantages. First, Roman soldiers served as legitimators of their commander's *imperium* and *honores* in the field and at home, as exemplified by their participation in the triumphal process and imperatorial acclamations, and,

in doing so, significantly influenced their future careers. Second, soldiers had the power to influence Roman policy regarding troop deployment. By sharing information about the realities of military service on particular campaigns upon returning from service, they shaped citizen attitudes towards the levy in the second century BCE, which ultimately led to changes in policy surrounding conscription. Moreover, we also see that long-serving units were able to act collectively to demand their release from service, forcing both their commanders and the Senate to alter their approach to warfare.

Chapter 1:
MIDDLE REPUBLICAN ARMIES AS COMMUNITIES

1.0: Introduction

A particularly important part of the move towards a more holistic vision of the armies of the Imperial period over the last several decades has been to consider these forces as communities. This approach rose to prominence in the early 1980s with the publication of two ground-breaking articles: Brent Shaw's "Soldiers and Society: The Army in Numidia" and Ramsey MacMullen's "Legion as Society." Though they employ different terminology, Shaw and MacMullen made essentially the same argument. Roman armies were, to use Shaw's term, "total institutions", communities with their own rituals, practices, and interests that were totally separate from the rest of Roman society.[1] A number of studies since then have explored how the nature of military service transformed a diverse set of recruits into a cohesive community: Haynes has demonstrated the existence of an empire-wide ideology of military service, while scholars like Pollard have shown the unique cultures that developed within particular legions.[2] Recent years have seen a very fruitful expansion of

1 Shaw 1983, 133-159; MacMullen 1984, 417-444. Shaw borrowed the term "total institution" from the 20th century sociologist, Erving Goffman, who used the term to refer to any occupation or residence that was effectively separated from the rest of society.

2 Empire-wide communities: Haynes 2013, 10-12. Distinct legionary culture: Pollard 1996, 211-227 (cf. also Goldsworthy and Haynes 1999).

the conception of Roman armies as communities. Scholars have contended that Roman armies were not hermetically-sealed off from the rest of society, but rather interacted with a wide range of non-combatants within and beyond the walls of the camp. Leading the way in this reframing were a number of female scholars including Carol van Driel-Murray, Lindsay Allason-Jones, Sarah Phang, Penelope Allison, and Elizabeth Greene, who have established beyond a shadow of a doubt the presence of women and children alongside military personnel in the period.[3] These studies have also been complemented by work about the relationship of Imperial soldiers to the regions in which they served. These studies have illustrated how closely connected legions could be to their environs and the people who inhabited them.[4] As a result, it has become abundantly clear that these armies had a significant impact on the economies, religious practices, and politics of both their environs and the empire as whole.[5]

Over the next three chapters, I intend to show how this framework of community can also be effectively applied to the armies of the third and second century BCE, in spite of Lee's aforementioned protestation that such an approach would be "largely irrelevant" for the Republic. By chronicling the complex network of connections and interactions that soldiers had while on campaign as well as the structures, systems, and historical contingencies that enabled them, these chapters highlight the manifold ways in which the armies developed communities, both within and beyond the walls of the Roman camp, during the Middle Republic. The image of the armies of the period that emerges from these chapters does not match with the way these forces have traditionally been represented in modern scholarship. Rather, we find that these armies were dynamic and diverse social organisms whose interactions actively shaped the development of the Mediterranean world in the aftermath of Roman imperial conquest.

The current chapter contributes to this larger narrative by looking at how the armies of this period constituted communities. The chapter begins by examining the armies in the third and second centuries within the framework of what sociologists term natural community. I show that, contrary to Lee's

3 E.g. van Driel-Murray 1995, 3-21; Allason-Jones 1999, 41-51; Phang 2001; Allason-Jones 2004, 273-287; van Driel-Murray 2008, 82-91; Allison 2013; 2015, 103-123; Greene 2015, 125-159; 2016, 942-953; 2020, 149-160.

4 Alston 1995, 13-39; Wesch-Klein 1998, 99-146; Popov 2015, 230-247.

5 Pollard 2000, 84-170; Pegler 2000, 37-43; Greene 2013, 17-32.

claims, the majority of soldiers who served in the third and second century BCE were not deployed on short-term campaigns, but rather multi-year campaigns, during which they lived in extremely close quarters, worked in shared spaces, and participated in shared activities on a daily basis. Following from Anderson and Cohen's theorizations of community, the chapter then moves on to consider how ideological factors served to bond soldiers together in this period. The practices, terminologies, and rituals of Roman military service in the third and second centuries drew on the most atavistic ideologies of community in the ancient world, the *polis* and the family, to foster a sense of cohesion among the diverse group of men who served in Roman armies during this period. What we begin to see in light of this analysis is that the nature and ideology of military service in the Middle Republic primed soldiers in Roman armies to develop a sense of shared identity. This sense of shared identity would prove important not only for Roman military success in the period, but, as we shall in later chapters, the ability of Roman soldiers to advance and protect their own interests as well.

1.1: Middle Republican Armies as Natural Communities

The earliest theorizations of community argued that communities "naturally" arose from shared physical space.[6] Sociologists of the late 19th and early 20th century quite sensibly contended that people who live or work together in close quarters share a unique set of experiences and develop a broader sense of collective consciousness as a result of those shared experiences. Although this view of community fell out of favor among social theorists of the second half of the twentieth century for a more identity-based approach (see below), the last twenty years have seen the reaffirmation of the particular importance of physical proximity in the development of communal identity.[7] While physical proximity does not necessarily produce community, the frequency of interpersonal interactions brought about by a shared geographic

6 The centrality of shared living spaces or occupations in this discourse of community is based in the sociological theory of the late 19th century. Tönnies' 1887 work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* argued for a distinction between community and society. Community (*Gemeinschaft*), according to Tönnies, was the more primitive of the two social groups, based on mutual bonds of affection and exemplified by the relationship between family members or townsmen. Society (*Gesellschaft*), on the other hand, was a result of urbanization and the rise of capitalism in the modern era.

7 Gray 2002, 38-59; Kempney 2002, 70-93; Mac Sweeney 2011, 18-22.

locale can solidify the bonds of a particular community "through the embodied experience of co-residence and shared social practices."[8]

The idea that community arises naturally from shared experiences and physical space, when viewed in terms of Roman military practices of the third and second centuries BCE, helps us to understand how military service in this period fostered a sense of community among Roman soldiers. First and foremost, Rome's ever-expanding imperial ambitions meant that its soldiers now spent extended periods of time living and working together. As Rosenstein has shown, the standard image of military campaigns of the late 4th and early 3rd century BCE as short-term campaigns conducted only in the summer months does not match with ancient evidence. Rather, it appears that, beginning with the Samnite War, Roman soldiers were required to take part in year-round military service with no opportunity for a furlough-type leave.[9] The terms of military service continued to grow more demanding for Roman soldiers throughout the third century BCE, reaching its peak during the Second Punic War. Because the war required Roman soldiers to be deployed at multiple locations throughout the Mediterranean at the same time, it was no longer feasible or practical to switch legions on an annual basis.[10] As a result, legions were required to fight together for multiple years, with some spending nearly a decade in service together. The *legiones Cannenses*, the two legions who survived the Battle of Cannae and were consequently exiled from Italy, served in Sicily from 214 - 204 BCE and in Africa with Scipio Africanus until the end of the war in 201 BCE.[11] Roman forces in Hispania during the conflict also experienced particularly long periods of service. Troops first came to Hispania in 218/7 and our sources record only two reinforcements between then and the end of the conflict in 206/5 – in 211, after the disastrous defeats of Scipio's father and uncle, and in 210, upon Scipio's election as commander.[12] Even beyond these soldiers in exceptional circumstances, a significant number of the legions enlisted during the Second Punic War spent several years fighting together. For example, when the Senate decided to disband seven legions in 210, the

8 Mac Sweeney 2011, 20.
9 Rosenstein 2004, 47-52.
10 Toynbee 1965, 2.74-6.
11 On the deployment of the *legiones Cannenses* in Sicily after 210, see Livy 27.8.11-13 (209); 27.22.8 (208); 27.36.12 (207); 28.10.13 (206); 29.13.6 (204).
12 211: Livy 26.17.1; 210: Livy 26.19.10.

troops who had been serving in these units had been fighting together for between four and six years.[13]

Though they would not fight a war quite as intense as the conflict with Hannibal, the Romans nevertheless continued to employ soldiers for long periods of time throughout the second century BCE. Beginning in 197 BCE, both Hispania Citerior and Ulterior had, at least, one legion.[14] It was not feasible to replace the legions in Hispania on an annual basis. In addition to the higher likelihood of success with veteran troops, large-scale mobilizations and all its attendant business – the levying of soldiers at Rome and among the allies, the equipping and provisioning of these new forces, and the arranging of mass transportation to Hispania – were difficult and time-consuming tasks.[15] As a result of the logistical difficulties of raising, providing for, and transporting a new army and the strategic problems of fighting with troops who had no experience in Hispania, veteran soldiers were rarely discharged *en masse*. Rather, Roman policy favored yearly *supplementa* to replace injured and killed soldiers or enhance their numbers in the case of an escalating conflict.[16] Exactly how long Roman soldiers spent in Hispania is controversial. Until recently, it was generally believed, based on two passages, one from Livy and one from Appian, that soldiers usually served for six years in the province.[17] However, Cadiou has recently cast doubt on these passages and argued that soldiers likely spent something closer to three years deployed in Hispania.[18] Though he admits that there were doubtless soldiers who were deployed in Hispania for longer periods, Cadiou contends that the size and frequency of *supplementa* as well as occasional demobilization of all the armed forces to celebrate a triumph hint at a shorter but still substantial deployment length in these provinces.[19]

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13 Rosenstein 2004, 189. Beyond these forces, it might also be mentioned that the two legions fighting in Sardinia during the war served for eleven and nine years, respectively.

14 Cadiou 2008 rejects the standard narrative of a standing garrisoned legion. There may also have been a praetorian legion in Macedonia. The primary evidence is not particularly extensive (cf. Livy *Per.* 53, 56, Eutrop. 4.15, SIG^3 700, App. *Mith.* 35 Julius Obsequens 43, 48). Brunt 1971, 428-429; Brennan 2000, 222-225; Eckstein 2013, 94-95 all argue for Roman military presence in Macedon from 145 forward, despite the protestation of Gruen 1984a, 433-436 about a lack of evidence.

15 Toynbee 1965, 2.76-79; Brunt 1971, 399.

16 E.g. Livy 36.2.9, 37.50.11, 39.20.4 (cf. Afzelius 1944, 40-61; Smith 1958, 6; Brunt 1971, 661-662; Potter 2004, 79).

17 Livy 31.49.5; App. *Iber.* 78.

18 Cadiou 2008, 141-156.

19 Cadiou 2008, 157-171.

Beyond the continual presence of two legions in Hispania, there were a number of other conflicts in the second century BCE in which Roman soldiers spent prolonged periods of time on campaign. In the case of the Roman centurion, Spurius Ligustinus, Livy says that he was commissioned to serve in Macedon at the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War in 200 BCE, but did not return to Rome until five years later in 196/5.[20] Similarly, Livy reports that the soldiers who had volunteered for the Third Macedonian War at its outset in 171 were still serving in 168 and didn't return home until the year after.[21] There are similar examples from the later second century BCE as well. The troops who were sent against Aristonicus in 131 had effectively brought the revolt to an end by 129, but they did not return home until 126 after five years of service.[22] Despite the fact that much is made of Marius' recruitment of volunteers *capite censi* in 107, his enrolment of troops at Rome was meant to be a *supplementum* for forces who had been serving in Africa since 111.[23] Those troops did not return home until 105, meaning that some of the soldiers in Marius' triumphant army had fought together for six years.

In addition to the extended period of service, the nature of the Roman camp, the *castra*, also fostered community development among troops in its armies. Modern studies of the nature of the Roman camps during the third and second centuries BCE, based on a combination of literary evidence from Polybius and Vegetius on castrametation and archaeological excavation of Republican camps in Spain and France, illustrate that soldiers lived in very tight quarters.[24] Reddé has estimated that there was approximately 19-30 m^2/soldier in Republican camps before taking into account the space allocated to streets or open areas.[25] Rosenstein, allotting 20% for pack animals, baggage, and the like, calculates a figure of around 13 m^2/soldier, if the camp followed Polybian prescriptions.[26] Such figures suggest that Republican camps were substantially smaller than their imperial counterparts which measure in

20 Livy 42.34.5. See Chapter 2, p. 70 for further discussion of Ligustinus and relevant bibliography.

21 Livy 43.14.7.

22 The *Fasti Triumphales* record that the triumph of Aquilius occurred in November, 126 BCE (cf. Brunt 1971, 429).

23 Sall. *Iug.* 86.4; Brunt 1971, 430; Gabba 1976, 15-19.

24 E.g. Polyb. 6.27-42; Veg. 3.9; Dobson 2008, 60-108; Reddé 2008, 61-71; Jiménez et al. 2018, 115-126.

25 Reddé 2008, 65-69.

26 Rosenstein 2012, 95-99.

at about 50 m^2/soldier.[27] A different perspective on the close quarters that soldiers shared in the context of Republican camps comes from a passage from pseudo-Hyginus which states that each tent (*contubernium*), roughly a 10 x 10 Roman foot space, housed eight Roman soldiers.[28] What this means is that six grown men – since notionally a quarter of the camp was on night guard – were sleeping in the equivalent of a small single bedroom, an observation that appears to be borne out in Spanish camps at Redondo and Lager III and V (Fig. 1).[29] While it is important to note that the military camps of the Republic were far from uniform in terms of permanence, size, and orientation and that, as such, all numerical calculations are necessarily speculative, they do help to illustrate just how tightly packed Republican *castra* were.

Moreover, *castra* were filled with public spaces that actively encouraged and fostered the development of an army-wide community through interpersonal interaction. This can be seen most prominently by the existence of the forum in the Roman camp. As a public, open space, the forum was the *locus* of all business, both official and commercial. All of the camp's inhabitants would have come together in the forum to participate in public rituals, such as the taking of the auspices before battle, events which would have affirmed visually that the inhabitants of the camp comprised a unified whole. Additionally, many soldiers would have frequented the forum to purchase food and various other provisions from merchants and traders in the camp.[30] Both official and commercial activities would have brought their soldiers into contact with people who were not members of their *contubernium* or maniple. Some, but not all, of these chance interactions would have resulted in friendships or business relations that created ties between different parts of the community and, consequently, strengthened communal bonds of the *castra* as a whole.

Another locale that actively fostered interaction among the soldiers was the *via principalis*. This road, the main thoroughfare of the camp, was constructed parallel to the praetorium and forum and measured over 120 feet in width (Fig. 1). Due to the constant foot traffic on the road and its proximity to the center of the camp, the *via principalis* became more than a thoroughfare. Indeed, Polybius records that it was the place where soldiers

27 Reddé 2008, 65-67.

28 Ps.-Hyginus, *De Metatione Castrorum* 1.

29 For a review of the evidence, both in pseudo-Hygninus and at Numantia, and different scholarly opinion, see Dobson 2008, 86-87.

30 For the evidence for merchants and traders in Roman camps, see Chapter 2.



Fig. 1. A Reconstruction of the Quarters for *Hastati* and *Principes*. Source: Drawing by M. Dobson from Dobson 2008.

spent their leisure time throughout the day.[31] The Roman response to the transformation of an area intended for travel into space of communal interaction indicates that the Romans understood the importance of such interactions within the *castra*. Rather than attempt to regulate the amount of social interaction between soldiers, it was a priority in the *castra* to ensure that the place for these interactions was maintained properly.[32] Two maniples were assigned to ensure the street's cleanliness and order.[33] Polybius' description of the praetorium-forum complex and the *via principalis* allows us not only to envisage a bustling central area of camp that provided space for interactions between its inhabitants, but also to understand the primary importance that developing communal bonds held within the *castra*.

What emerges from this discussion is that the natural preconditions for the development of a sense of community were embedded in Roman military practice during the Middle Republic. From the third century onwards, Roman soldiers spent prolonged periods of time living, working, and fighting together. We can imagine that the shared experience of the harsh realities of warfare, the particularities of the regions in which they served, and the tasks that they all shared as a fighting force created a sense of shared identity among soldiers serving in the same army. Moreover, the nature of the physical spaces that these soldiers inhabited facilitated the interaction and exchange between its inhabitants. In the section that follows, we will see that these natural conditions were reinforced by the ideologies and practices of the Middle Republican armies.

1.2: Middle Republican Armies as Ideological Communities

One of the key developments that emerged from late twentieth century sociology was that shared physical space, in and of itself, is not enough to create a sense of community. These sociologists contended that communities were ultimately ideological rather than physical constructions.[34] They held

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31 Polyb. 6.33.4: τὴν γὰρ διατριβὴν ἐν ταῖς καθημερείαις οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν ταύτῃ ποιοῦνται τῇ πλατείᾳ.

32 Dobson 2008, 102-104.

33 Polyb. 6.33.4.

34 The foremost works in this movement away from the natural definition of community are Anderson 1983 and Cohen 1985. Anderson argues that newspapers and other media played a major role in the creation of the nation-state by providing an avenue for the development of a shared national ideology among people who did not know each other, who would never see each other, and who had significant differences.

that a group's normative values – its practices, rituals, and moral codes – were what created a sense of community among its members. This framework served to explain, for instance, how people who lived in very different physical spaces and had no opportunity to interact could see themselves, for instance, as members of the same religious sect or nation-state. This formulation of community reframed the concept in a radical manner – in the words of Cohen, communities were "a resource and repository of meaning and a referent of [its constituents'] *identity*."[35]

These ideas about the ideological foundations of community have been influential in studies of ancient armies, particularly, as a way of explaining military cohesion and, by extension, success.[36] However, as Armstrong has noted, these applications have tended to locate any sense of cohesion in armies along the socio-political lines.[37] In case of the armies of the Republic, scholars have often put forth the view that Roman armies were successful because they were a citizen-soldier army.[38] Because these soldiers had a personal and political stake in warfare, unlike the mercenary forces employed by their rivals, they were more likely to persist even in the most difficult of circumstances. Yet, the idea that an allegiance to the *res publica* was a determinant factor in Rome's military cohesion and success ignores the fact that, for much of our period, at least half of the soldiers fighting in these forces were Italians recruited from allied city-states or local auxiliary units. In many cases, the allied and auxiliary troops fighting in Rome's army had seen their own states conquered in the very recent past. Socio-political symbolism would have mattered little to the half of the army who felt no connection to, at best, and strong distaste for, at worst, the *res publica*. As we shall see, these socio-political factors worked more powerfully at the unit-level where troupes were often formed along ethnic lines.[39]

So, what ideologies *could* make soldiers from such diverse backgrounds feel as if they were part of a larger community? Kathryn Milne's 2012 article on the use of familial paradigms within the armies of the Republic offers an

35 Cohen 1985, 118.

36 E.g. Hanson 1989, 117-118; van Wees 2004, 95-97.

37 Armstrong 2016b, 102-105.

38 Brand 2019 is the fullest and most recent exposition of this thesis, but the idea that citizen-soldiers fueled Republican success can also be found in other places include Brunt 1965 and Nicolet 1980, 49-148. Milne 2009, 8-42 discusses how this was instantiated historiographically.

39 See Chapter 2, pp. 79-92.

intriguing solution to this problem.[40] Milne contends that adopting a familial paradigm, the most atavistic form of community, provided Roman soldiers with the intellectual toolkit for negotiating the strangeness of military service – new physical surroundings and unfamiliar colleagues – by allowing them to assimilate it to something more familiar.[41] Further, using the family as a referent for social relations was particularly powerful because of its "universal" applicability even among troops who came from a variety of ethnic and social backgrounds. In the sections that follow, I will draw on and expand Milne's observations to show that the spaces and social relationships of Republican military service were constructed to mirror not just the family, but other essential communal structures important to the soldiers fighting in the army. The use of paradigms that were familiar and legible to the vast majority of military conscripts helped to transform an otherwise disparate group of soldiers into a cohesive community.

1.3: Communal Ideologies and the Republican *Castra*

In his detailed description of the nature of Roman military camps, Polybius refers on two occasions to *castra* as a πόλις.[42] For instance, after detailing the design and dimensions of the camp, Polybius explicitly calls the Roman encampment a square which took on the appearance of a πόλις (πόλει παραπλησίαν).[43] Later, in describing the orderly fashion in which the soldiers set up the camp, he adds that since the soldiers knew exactly where they would live, the setting up of the *castra* resembled "the return of an army to its native city" (γίνεταί τι παραπλήσιον, οἷον ὅταν εἰς πόλιν εἰσίῃ στρατόπεδον ἐγχώριον).[44] Polybius' identification of Roman camps with the πόλις is, of course, rather loaded – his observation drew from a long-standing Greek historiographical tradition of identifying armies as cities and represents an idealized etic perspective on the order and organization found in Roman camps.[45] But it is

40 Milne 2012, 25-41.
41 Milne 2012, 38.
42 Milne 2012, 28.
43 Polyb. 6.31.10.
44 Polyb. 6.41.10.
45 This idea of army as a polis can also be found in classical Greek historiography in Thucydides' description of the troops in the Sicilian expedition as well as Xenophophon's *Anabasis* (cf. Hornblower 2011, 226-249). It should also be noted that later authors observing Roman camps noted this as well, cf. Joseph. *BJ.* 3.83; Veg. *Mil.* 1.21.

also unavoidable that Polybius in using the term πόλις was casting the *castra* as much more than just a military camp. He was comparing the *castra* to one of the most fundamental and ideologically-laden forms of community in the Mediterranean world. As such, Polybius' observations reveal that the ideology of community underpinning Roman military camps was legible and translatable to a non-Roman eyewitness.

Investigating some of the finer details of Polybius' narrative show that the *castra* replicated many of the patterns and features that could be found in settlements throughout the Italic peninsula.[46] For instance, the unit of measurement used by Polybius to describe the dimensions of the camp has been shown to be multiples of the Roman *actus*, 120 Roman feet. The *actus* was originally an agricultural term used to describe how far the oxen attached to a plough were driven before they were turned.[47] From the fourth century BCE onwards, a square (the *actus quadratus*), whose sides measured the length of an *actus*, became the unit used for the rectangular grid system not only in Roman settlements, but throughout Italy.[48] Further correspondences to the patterning of Roman and Italic settlements can be found in the layout of the roads in the *castra*.[49] According to Polybius, the main road of the camp, the *via principalis*, ran perpendicular to two other large thoroughfares, the *via praetoria* and the *via decumana* and it was at the intersection of these three roads that the two most important structures in the camp, the *forum* and *praetorium*, were located (Fig. 2).[50] This system of perpendicular thoroughfares whose conjunction marked the center of the settlement evokes the famous *cardo-decumanus* model often found in cities throughout the peninsula.[51] As a result, the living quarters for the soldiers, which were broken up into rows of ten units (one *actus quadratus* for each maniple/*turma* of a particular kind of troops), were divided between the fifth and the sixth unit by the

46 Rykwert 1988, 68-69.

47 Plin. *NH* 18.9: *actus, in quo boves agerentur cum aratro uno impetu iusto. Hic erat CXX pedum duplicatusque in longitudinem iugerum faciebat* (cf. Dilke 1971, 82; Dobson 2008, 71).

48 Varro *Ling.* 5.34; *Rust.* 1.10.2; Columella *Rust.* 5.1.5 (cf. Dobson 2008, 71). Dilke 1971, 88; Castagnoli 1971, 100; Ward-Perkins 1974, 28 reveal the centrality of grid planning for the development of Italian city-states.

49 Polyb. 6.29.2: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ῥύμαις παραπλήσιον ἀποτελεῖται τὸ τῶν διόδων σχῆμα πασῶν, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους αἷς μὲν ταγμάτων.

50 As Dobson 2008, 83, citing Schulten 1927, 107, notes, the term *via decumana* is a modern construction.

51 Keppie 1984, 22; Broadhead 2007, 147-153.

via quintana.[52] The placing of *via quintana* in such a position again appears to have had an analogue in Roman settlement practices as well; Hyginus Gromaticus says that the boundary between every fifth land plot was a road known as the *limes actuarius*.[53]

The camp also contained several other features that were hallmarks of the Italic cities from which many of its soldiers hailed. Polybius claims that the space where the commander took up residence, the *praetorium*, was the first place marked out in the camp.[54] The details Polybius provides about the careful marking out of the space for the *praetorium* indicate that it may have served as more than lodging for the general. The placing of a σημαία on the ground and the measuring out of a square from that point has reminded scholars of the process of inaugurating a space as a *templum*.[55] Dobson has also noted the necessary functioning of the *praetorium* as a place of augury.[56] Military commanders who were required to take the auspices prior to battle needed an inaugurated space in which to do so.[57] The importance of the augural aspects of the *praetorium*, Dobson argues, are also demonstrated by the fact that the commander's tent was at times referred to as the *augurale*.[58] Even the usual word for the commander's tent, the *tabernaculum*, could refer to the tent of an augur.[59] Understanding the religious significance of *praetorium* and its similarities to a *templum* help to show how camp structure attempted to recreate patterns used in settlements throughout the Italic peninsula. The camp's religious complex was its first foundation and centrally located, echoing the central topographic position of many temples in Roman foundations throughout Italy as well in the cities of Latium and Etruria.[60]

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52 Polyb. 6.30.5-6; Livy 41.2.11.

53 Hyginus Gromaticus, *De Limitibus Constituendis* 19.2. The *via quintana* was also part of the aforementioned rectangular network of roads in the camp as it ran parallel to the *via principalis*.

54 Polyb. 6.27.1.

55 Polyb. 6.27.1-2. Oxé 1939, 53; Dobson 2008, 74.

56 Quint. *Inst*. 8.2.8; Tac. *Ann*. 2.13, 15.30 refer to the *praetorium* as a place of augury (cf. also Dobson 2008, 74).

57 Cic. *Div*. 1.35; Livy 22.42.3, 23.36.9; Val. Max. 1.6.4 provides examples of commanders taking the auspices before battle (cf. Scheid and Lloyd 2003, 114).

58 Quint. *Inst*. 8.2.8; Tac. *Ann*. 2.13, 15.30; Dobson 2008, 74.

59 Cic. *De Div*. 1.33, 2.76.

60 Potts 2015 shows how religious buildings were topographically central in the development of towns in Latium and Etruria.

Additionally, to the east of the *praetorium* is what Polybius describes as the ἀγορά.[61] Polybius' ἀγορά seems to have functioned like a forum: it was both a place for official business under the supervision of the commander as well as a market area where troops could buy any necessary provisions.[62] The location of a public forum-type construction to the east of an inaugurated religious space was a common arrangement for Roman settlements throughout Italy, demonstrating yet another homology between the structure of military camps and Roman/Italic settlements (Fig. 2).[63] Furthermore, Polybius' identification of the forum space as an ἀγορά suggests that it was potentially legible to a Greek audience – soldiers recruited from Magna Graecia and Sicily – as well. Dickenson has recently argued that it seems unlikely that Greeks saw fora as being materially different than the agora – Latin and Greek authors "were happy to refer to the square of the other by the word they used for their own squares" and the buildings and construction elements of both places were remarkably similar.[64]

What these observations reveal is that military camps were not an altogether new type of construction tied to a specific military purpose. The patterning and structures of the camp would have been familiar to the soldiers and, consequently, may have evoked the memory of life in towns and cities they previously inhabited.[65] Moreover, the embodied experience of walking through the camp, observing familiar physical structures, and taking part in public practices would have further reinforced the powerful ideas underlying the construction of camp as πόλις. Indeed, in the Mediterranean world of the third and second centuries BCE, the πόλις and its analogues were not just places in which people lived; they epitomized ancient conceptions of community.[66] In its resemblances to a town, the

61 Polyb. 6.31.1.

62 Festus. *Gloss. Lat.* 309L indicates that military *fora* were places where one could get provisions (cf. Petrikovits 1975, 140). Roth 1999, 100 argues that the forum was just a center for collection of provisions and is doubtful that it served as an actual market place for soldiers.

63 Dobson 2008, 76-77.

64 Dickenson 2016, 212.

65 Cf. Polyb. 6.31.10, 6.41.10; Cagniart 1992, 232; Milne 2012, 27-29.

66 Scholars have long questioned the vitality of the πόλις in the Hellenistic period, but work by the likes of Will 1975, 297-318; Ma 2001, 337-376; and Billows 2007, 196-215 has demonstrated that the πόλις still served as the most important marker of community in the period.



Fig. 2. A Reconstruction of the Polybian Manipular Double-Consular Camp. Source: Drawing by M. Dobson from Dobson 2008.

camp replicated a form of community that its inhabitants knew well and that instinctively promoted feelings of familiarity and a shared sense of identity among its soldiers.

These instinctive feelings of community were strengthened through ritual and practice that centered around the protection of the *castra*. Take, for example, Polybius' description of the Roman night watch. Each maniple was required to furnish four sentinels for the night guard, one for each of the four night watches.[67] The man in charge of the first watch, accompanied by an *optio* from his maniple, received four small distinct tokens (*tesserae*) from the tribune, one for each of the soldiers assigned to the different night watches.[68] To ensure that these soldiers were doing their job properly, four *equites*, one for each night watch, were assigned to check the status of these manipular sentinels.[69] If the *eques* found the night watchman to be awake, he received the *tessera* from the guard and, if not, he called on the men traveling with him to serve as witnesses before moving on to the next station without collecting the *tessera*.[70] If all *tesserae* were not returned, the tribune ascertained which maniple's *tessera* is missing and the centurion and the picket assigned to the night watch by that maniple as well as the *equites* on patrol were called in front of the tribune to determine who was at fault.[71] Whoever was adjudged to have erred was called before a court of all the tribunes and if he was found guilty, he was subjected to the *fustuarium*. The *fustuarium* was administered in a public forum, initiated by the tribune, who touched the culprit with a stick, before releasing him to the rest of the inhabitants of the *castra* who stoned and beat him usually to the point of death.[72] The complex process described by Polybius reveals that securing the physical location of the camp was a shared task in which every part of the community played an important role. There were both people and procedures put in place not only to ensure the successful completion of the task, but to affirm the honesty and earnestness of those involved. The severity and publicity of the punishment illustrates that the security and safety of the entire *castra* was of paramount concern

67 Polyb. 6.35.6.
68 Polyb. 6.35.6-7.
69 Polyb. 6.35.8,11.
70 Polyb. 6.36.2-3.
71 Polyb. 6.36.6-9.
72 Polyb. 6.37.1-3. On the reality of the *fustuarium* as a punishment, see now Machado 2021 (*contra* Goldberg 2015; Pearson 2019).

for every member of the community and that failure in this regard meant exclusion from that community.[73]

A similar ideology can be found in the oath administered upon the completion of camp construction by the tribunes to every person in the camp, both slave and free.[74] Each person swore to steal nothing from the camp and to bring anything he finds to the tribunes.[75] This oath created a bond of communal responsibility between all those who resided in the camp and enshrined the *castra* as a place that was meant to be inviolate for its inhabitants.[76] The punishment for breaking the oath was the *fustuarium*, indicating once again the communal and public enforcement of this particular ideology. In both of these examples, the Romans constructed a sense of community in the camp by elevating the ideological importance of the physical space of the *castra*. The *castra*, then, was not just a physical unit which looked like a settlement, but a stable and well-defined community. The ideological construction of the *castra* as polis and the defined role of each *miles* within its communal space anchored and grounded soldiers even as they changed the physical location of their camp during campaigns.

This metaphor of firmity and permanence was reinforced by another closely-related ideological paradigm – the conception of the Roman military camp as a "home" for the soldiers that inhabited it.[77] The way in which the *castra* were constructed as a home is outlined in the purported speech of Aemilius Paullus on the eve of the Battle of Pydna.[78] Paullus, in an attempt to justify why he had not committed to battle on the previous day, embarks on an extended discussion about the importance of the *castra* for the Roman army. He refers to the *castra* as a second fatherland for soldiers (*patria altera militaris*) and as their home base (*sedes*) with ramparts for walls (*uallumque*

73 Cagniart 1992, 233 (cf. Polyb. 6.37.4).

74 Polyb. 6.33.1. For a discussion of slaves in the Roman camp, see Chapter 2.

75 Polyb. 6.33.2.

76 For ancient evidence on the *sacramentum* and its nature, see Polyb. 6.21.2, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 10.18, Livy 22.38, Plut. *Sull*. 27.4, App. *BCiv*. 1.66. The centrality of the *sacramentum* to the structuring of Roman military service is emphasized by Watson 1969, 44-50; Campbell 1984, 19-30; Phang 2008, 117-120; Brice 2020a, 46-48.

77 Mommsen 1881, 3.203 famously said of the Roman soldier of the Late Republican period that "[h]is only home was the camp, his only science war, his only hope the general – what this implied, is clear."

78 Livy 44.39.1-9. Briscoe 2012, 592-593 largely focuses on the textual issues with the speech and the intratextual references to the complaints of his soldiers.

pro moenibus), echoing the close association of the *castra* with one's city we saw above. Paullus continues by adding that *castra* provided not just a tent for each soldier, but also a *domus* and *penates*.[79] As Milne argues, for Paullus, the *castra* represented a homeland for the soldiers in which each had his own domicile and household gods, a place where soldiers formed real and deeply embedded attachments that paralleled those they had at home.[80] Paullus makes it clear that the camp had long held this special significance for members of the Roman army; the *maiores* had viewed the camp as a safe-haven in times of both victory and defeat (*maiores uestri castra munita portum ad omnis casus exercitus ducebant esse*) and, as such, there was a long history of the camp serving as inspiration for routed Roman soldiers to return to battle.[81]

Two terms, *domus* and *penates*, that Paullus uses in this speech provide important insight into the way that the *castra* created a sense of belonging for the soldiers in the Roman army. First, the use of these words further imbued the Roman camp with a sense of physical permanence, as the term *domus* often referred to a non-temporary physical domicile in which someone lived, a meaning most explicitly evidenced by Cicero's *de Domo sua*.[82] In the *Aeneid*, the *Penates* were emblematic of Aeneas' destiny as the founder of the Roman state and the ultimate settlement of the *Penates* at Lavinium symbolized, in the words of Milne, a "move from a state of nomadism…into a state of permanency and stability."[83] The physical permanence of the *penates* is emphasized further by the famous story of how they remained at Lavinium and refused to move along with Ascanius to Alba Longa after Aeneas' death.[84]

As the aforementioned anecdote suggests, the *penates* were not just important for Roman soldiers, but they were legible to non-Roman soldiers as well. The official cult center for *penates* was located at Lavinium and dated all the way back to the fifth century BCE, a testament to their long-standing importance throughout Latium.[85] Moreover, the cult site also

79 Livy 44.39.5.

80 Milne 2012, 28.

81 Livy 44.39.2. In Livy's narrative of the battle of Caudine Forks, when the Romans are surrounded by the Samnites, their first instinct in this time of disaster is to build a camp (cf. Livy 9.2.13-14).

82 Saller 1984, 341-343.

83 Milne 2012, 29.

84 Val. Max. 1.8.7; Dion. Hal. 1.67.

85 E.g. Varr. *Ling. Lat*. 5.144; Val. Max. 1.6.7. See Alföldi 1965, 238-278; Wiseman 1974, 153-154; Gruen 1992, 24-29 for further discussion of the central place that Lavinium occupied in the framing of Roman cultural beliefs, particularly, around the *Lares* and *Penates*.



Fig. 3. Archaic Inscription to the Dioscuri at Lavinium, 5th century BCE.
Source: Museo Nazionale Romano: Terme di Diocleziano. (Dan Diffendale/Flickr)

Fig. 4. RRC 307/1, denarius of Marcus Fonteius, 108/107 BCE.
Source: ANS 1950.103.11.

Fig. 5. RRC 312/1, denarius of Gaius Sulpicius (obverse), 106 BCE.
Source: ANS 1937.158.28.

intimates the close connection of the *Penates* with Greek religion. A dedication to the Dioscuri, gods closely associated with the familial unit due to their brotherhood, was found in close proximity to the shrine to the *Lares* (Fig. 3).[86] Cult statues of *Penates* closely resembled and were often paired with those of the Dioscuri (Figs. 4 and 5) and, as early as the fourth century BCE, certain authors claimed that the *Penates* were Greek in origin.[87] A similar, but even more poorly understood set of household gods, known as the *di animales,* were worshipped by the Etruscans as well.[88] The similarities between the *Penates* and the *di animales* in conception were strong enough that it led antiquarians in the first century BCE to suggest that the *Penates* were Etruscan in origin.[89] What this amounts to is that the *Penates* were a symbol of the physical and stable household that was legible to numerous audiences in the Roman camp.

1.4: Middle Republican Armies as Families

The references to *domus* and *penates* in Paullus' speech, however, connote more than just permanency and stability. As Saller has shown, the term *domus* was not limited in meaning to the physical structure of a house.[90] The *domus* could refer to the people, both free and non-free, who were part of the household.[91] At times, the term could have a more intimate sense, referring to the nuclear family or the broader kinship relations, both cognate and agnate. On rare occasions, it could even signify all the male members of a Roman family, a valence that would be particularly fitting for the soldiers in the Roman army.[92] The term also captured the various emotional attachments wrapped up in these relationships, a valence not dissimilar to modern distinctions between house and home.

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86 Cf. Castognoli 1959, 109; Weinstock 1960, 112-118 for initial publication of the inscription.

87 Milne 2012 also makes an interesting observation about the connection of the Dioscuri to the *Penates* during the Republic, thereby, reinforcing their association with the Roman military power.

88 Serv. ad *Aen*. 3.168, allegedly derived from Cornelius Labeo's religious works (see also Jannot 2005, 69, 170-172).

89 E.g. Nigidius Figulus ap. Arnobius 3.40 (cf. Weinstock 1946, 101-129; Torelli 1995, 114).

90 Saller 1984, 343-353; 1994, 81-85.

91 E.g. Cic. *Rosc*. *Amer*. 96; Ov. *Fast*. 4.543 (cf. Saller 1984, 344). Unlike the *familia*, which generally referred to enslaved members of the household to the exclusion of the free members.

92 Plin. *Ep*. 1.14.6, 2.9.3, 4.15.4 (cf. Saller 1984, 344-345; 1994, 84).

Fig. 6. RRC 458/1, Denarius of Julius Caesar (obverse), 47/46 BCE.
Source: ANS 1937.158.263.

Analogous observations can be made about the *penates*. Bodel has shown that the *penates* represented an important expression of individual religion; the collections of deities and heroes that were part of the household *penates* were eclectic and personalized and often were passed down from generation to generation.[93] The composition of the *penates* was based in large part on personal preference or a particular affinity for what the gods represented.[94] To return to the story of Aeneas and his *penates*, while they did represent the destiny of the Roman state, they also were Aeneas' most personal belongings. Depictions of the hero frequently show him carrying Anchises on his shoulder, holding the hand of Ascanius, and carrying the *penates* (usually the Palladium) in the other hand (Fig. 6).[95] In these representations of Aeneas, the *penates* appear as part and parcel of his family and represent a tradition that would have been passed between the different generations displayed on the coin.

Thus, by using the terms, *domus* and *penates*, Paullus figures the Roman camp as a space that soldiers would connect to on an emotional level and where they could foster close connections with their fellow soldiers. This ideological framework was reinforced by the use of familial metaphors to characterize relationships between camp inhabitants. This metaphorization started at the top with the representation of the commander as a father figure, the head

93 Bodel 2008, 260-262.
94 Bodel 2008, 262.
95 In addition to the coin of Julius Caesar, cf. Bodel 2008, 254.

of the Roman army's household. There are a number of incidents from the Republic in which a general was explicitly referred to as *pater*. For instance, in 217, Fabius Maximus was awarded the title of *pater* after he rescued the forces of Marcus Minucius from an ambush orchestrated by Hannibal.[96] The honorific was bestowed on Fabius by Minucius for saving his life as well as those of his troops.[97] As Milne has shown, the use of this title was closely related to the role of the domestic *pater* as a preserver and protector of his children.[98] Following this logic, successful commanders were given the title of *pater patriae*, both officially and unofficially, for preserving the state during a time of military crisis. Caesar was awarded the title for vanquishing his foes at Munda in 45 BCE and Camillus and Marius are referred to in later texts as *pater* or *parens patriae* for their role in saving the state from Gallic incursions.[99]

It was not just titulature that substantiated this parallel. Both commander and father were cemented in Roman imagination as figures of unrivaled power and authority who demanded the respect of their subordinates. This power was based fundamentally in a set of rights and privileges that the two shared. Both held the power of life and death over members of their families; both were expected to protect their family members from harm; and both had effective authority over their family members until they reached marriageable age.[100] The famous story of the general, Titus Manlius Torquatus, and his son illustrates the overlap between these two roles.[101] In this story, Torquatus' son breaks ranks and engages in single combat with a Tusculan soldier against his

96 See Livy 22.24-29 for the full context of the episode.

97 Livy 22.29.10-11. This can be compared to the traditions surrounding the *corona civica*, a crown that could be given by any citizen or ally to the man who saved his life in battle (Polyb. 6.39.7; cf. Maxfield 1981, 71-72). This decoration, however, came with a specific requirement for the soldier who was saved: he had to treat his preserver as his father for the rest of his life and "must treat him like a parent in every way" (Polyb. 6.39.7; cf. also Cic. Planc. 72).

98 Milne 2012, 33-34.

99 There is some debate as to the historicity of the titles of Marius and Camillus (cf. Miles 1997, 100). Alföldi 1953, 105, for example, asserts that Marius held the title in an official capacity, while Weinstock 1971, 202 is more skeptical about this claim and accepts Pliny's assertion that Cicero was the first person to be awarded the title.

100 Milne 2012, 31. The extent to which these broader cultural ideals about fatherhood were actually practiced by the Romans has been questioned by Saller 1994, 102-154 and Shaw 2001, 31-77.

101 Livy 8.7-8. Oakley 1998, 436-444 discusses in detail the development of the story over time (cf. Nisbet 1959, 73). Lushkov 2015, 46-51 points out the importance of family dynamics in this scene to construct an exemplary and didactic model. Other ancient accounts of the incident: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 8.79.2; Dio fr. 35.2; Zon. 7.26.3-5.

father's orders.[102] Although Torquatus' son is successful in the engagement, his father nevertheless orders execution for his insubordination. In justifying the decision to kill his son, Torquatus cites the parallel models of authority of a commander and father, excoriating his son for his disregard for consular *imperium* and fatherly *maiestas* (*neque imperium consulare neque maiestatem patriam ueritus*).[103] Further, Torquatus claims that the decision to kill his son was necessary for him to ensure that he did not become neglectful as both a general and a father (*ut aut rei publicae mihi aut meorum obliuiscendum sit*).[104] Throughout the story, Torquatus blurs the line between his power as father and as general to justify the execution and perform the killing.[105]

The story of Torquatus was an old one. Polybius, writing in the second century BCE, claims to be aware of a number of stories about Roman generals killing their own sons, thereby revealing the importance of the metaphor of fatherhood in substantiating the hierarchical relationship between soldier and commander.[106] Another passage from the second century BCE offers more evidence of this phenomenon. In Terence's *Adelphoe*, a play that centers around a debate between two brothers about the proper way to raise a son, one of the brothers, Micio, discusses the ideal nature of a relationship between father and son:

> *nimium ipse durust praeter aequomque et bonum,*
> *et errat longe mea quidem sententia*
> *qui* ***imperium*** *credat gravius esse aut stabilius*
> ***vi*** *quod fit quam illud quod* ***amicitia*** *adiungitur.*
> *mea sic est ratio et sic animum induco meum:*
> *malo coactu' qui suom officium facit,*
> *dum id rescitum iri credit, tantisper cavet;*
> *si sperat fore clam, rursum ad ingenium redit;*
> *ille quem* ***beneficio adiungas*** *ex animo facit,*
> *studet par referre, praesens absensque idem erit.*
> *hoc patriumst, potiu' consuefacere filium*
> *sua sponte recte facere quam alieno metu:*
> *hoc* ***pater*** *ac dominus interest. hoc qui nequit*
> *fateatur nescire* ***imperare*** *liberis.*

102 Livy 8.7-8.

103 Livy 8.7.15.

104 Livy 8.7.16. Lushkov 2015, 48 argues that one of Livy's key points in this scene is to show that the son was unable to distinguish between Titus Manlius' dual identity as father and general.

105 Milne 2012, 33. Ogilvie 1965, 580 does not discuss the relationship between these two incidents.

106 Polyb. 6.54.5.

> He himself is excessively harsh beyond what is fair and reasonable and he who believes that authority, which is established by force, is more firm and more stable than that which is engendered by friendship errs significantly in my opinion. This is my reasoning and this is how I think: he who is compelled by harsh treatment does his duty only so long as he believes it will be monitored and as a result he is guarded; but if he believes that it will be secret, again he returns to his natural impulses; he whom you enjoined by kindness, he strives to pay you back like for like, and he will be the same whether you are present or absent. This is "fatherly", to accustom one's son to act rightly of his own accord rather than out of fear of another: this is the difference between a father and a master. Whoever denies this admits to know not how to govern his children.[107]

In the speech, Micio conceptualizes a father's power over his sons with the language of generalship. He uses the word *imperium*, the formal term for a general's realm of power, and verb, *imperare*, a technical word for leading an army, to refer to the authority and duty of a father.[108] Moreover, Micio's description of the various approaches to fatherhood – one defined by the use of force (*vi*) and the other by friendship (*amicitia*) – mirrors the diametrically-opposed archetypes of the martinet commander who adheres closely to "traditional" discipline and the exceedingly generous commander who cultivates his relationship with his soldiers through gifts and opportunities to plunder.[109] The intellectual slippage between the general and father in this scene and throughout the play is reinforced by the historical circumstances in which it was produced. Terence allegedly wrote the play in 160 BCE for the

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107 Ter. *Adelph*. 65-77.

108 *Imperium* was used to describe the relationship between father and son in the works of Cato and Plautus as well as in other plays written by Terence (e.g. Plaut. *Amph*. 991-2; *Bacch*. 459; *Stich*. 141; Ter. *Phorm*. 232-3.) Cf. Leigh 2004, 178 n. 87 for more references in which *imperium* is used to reference paternal authority over a child.

109 Leigh 2004, 175-189. The development of a friendly relationship between Roman soldiers and their commanders is exemplified by the use of the term, *commilitiones* (fellow-soldier) by commanders in the Republican period (cf. Campbell 1984, 31-50 for a history of the terminology). The term had become current by the time of Civil War between Caesar and Pompey, as both generals use the terminology while addressing their soldiers (e.g. App. *BCiv*. 2.72). The word had become so popular that Augustus disavowed the term and forbade family members from using it. While there is no explicit evidence for the use of the term *commilitiones* before Caesar, there is evidence that the idea behind it was circulating long before this (e.g. Marius' speech in Sall. *Iug.* 85.31-3).

funeral games of Aemilius Paullus, the famed victor of the battle of Pydna. While Paullus was very well-known for being a general devoted above all to discipline, he was also remembered by Roman historians for his analogously pious and restrained parenting of his sons.[110]

The scene and the play as a whole not only affirms the commander as *pater* trope, but adds further nuance to the paradigm. Micio contends in his speech that the father who uses force (*vi*) to ensure the obedience of his sons will not lead to them doing the right thing in the absence of close surveillance. Rather, if a father takes a friendlier (*amicitia*) approach, he produces sons who will act rightly of their own accord. According to Micio, a father can foster this type of relationship through the distribution of *beneficia*. The use of *beneficium* once again cues us into the slippage between father and commander in the scene – the term can refer to a general atmosphere of kindness, but it was frequently used as a technical term in a military context to refer to special favors given to soldiers by their commanders and by metonymy to a very close relationship between soldiers and their commander.[111] What Micio's speech shows is that effective fatherhood and generalship was also *affective*. Good fathers and good commanders bound their sons and soldiers to them emotionally as a means of ensuring that they would act to protect their respective *familiae*, thereby fulfilling their "communal" duty.

Carrying out the metaphor of general as *pater* to its logical conclusion would cast soldiers in the army as *fratres*.[112] Indeed, our sources show that the Romans of the Republic conceptualized the ideal comrades-in-arms as brothers, as can be seen in the famous battle between the Horatii and the Curatii.[113] After what was a long and intense conflict between Rome and Alba Longa, the Alban king, Mettius Fufetius, beseeched his Roman counterpart to find another way of deciding the war.[114] They agreed that two sets of triplets, one Alban, the Curiatii, and the other Roman, the Horatii, would fight against one

110 E.g. Polyb. 32.8; Plut. *Aem*. 6.8, 22.1-4, 35-36.

111 Gruen 1995, 378-379 (cf. Cic. *Fam*. 5.20.7; Livy 9.30.3, 45.42.11; *B. Afr*. 54.5).

112 In the Imperial period, soldiers referred to one another as *fratres*. In a similar vein, Virgil could describe soldiers fighting in battle as sharing one mindset (*unanimi*) just like brothers.

113 Livy 1.23.5-1.25.14. Ogilvie 1965, 107-113. Ogilvie discusses how the idea of a battle of "champions" can be found in many other Indo-European cultural traditions. However, none of the examples that he cites here involve brothers.

114 Livy 1.23.7-9.

another to decide the outcome of the war.[115] After a dramatic duel, the Horatii and, by extension, the Romans emerge victorious, eventually resulting in the abandonment of Alba Longa and the merging of the two states.[116]

In this iconic story, the brothers Horatii literally and figuratively stand in for the entirety of the Roman army. As Armstrong has argued, the cooperation of the brothers is linked expressly to devotion to the Roman army and, consequently, to the protection of their *patria* from foreign threats.[117] Indeed, as the triplets charged into battle, Livy says that they had no concern for their own safety, but only thought of their great responsibility for the *patria* (*nec his nec illis periculum suum, publicum imperium seruitiumque obuersatur animo futuraque ea deinde patriae fortuna quam ipsi fecissent*).[118] Further, Livy explicitly connects their affection for one another as brothers with their love for the state. When the victorious and only remaining member of the Horatii returns from battle, he describes his accomplishment of defeating the Alban triplets as a tribute to both his fallen brothers and to the Roman state (*duos… fratrum manibus dedi; tertium causae belli huiusce, ut Romanus Albano imperet, dabo*).[119] The exemplary behavior of the brothers came to represent Roman soldiers at their best as men defined by affection to their *fratres*/fellow soldiers and, by extension, the state as a whole. The language of the family and home reminded soldiers of social constructs with which they were acquainted and activated emotional connections that brought the soldiers together within a communal framework.

One final example of idealized brothers-at-arms – that of Castor and Pollux – helps us to see the especial value that a fraternal framework had for armies of Middle Republic. Beginning in the fifth century BCE, Castor and Pollux served as symbols of Roman victory and military power.[120] The first temple to the Dioscuri at Rome was established in 484 BCE

115 Livy 1.24.1.
116 Livy 1.25-28.
117 Armstrong 2013, 63-64.
118 Livy 1.25.3. Wiseman 1995, 18-30, citing Puhvel's work on brotherhood, argues that the story of the Horatii and Curiatii might be viewed within the context of expiatory sacrifice necessary for the success of the state on broader level.
119 Livy 1.25.12.
120 Champlin 2011, 74; Armstrong 2013, 59-60; Gartrell 2021, 11-13 offer a brief history of Castor and Pollux in the archaic period. Castor and Pollux are prominent in the archaeological and epigraphic evidence from the sixth and fifth centuries BCE.

in thanksgiving for their support during the Battle of Lake Regillus.[121] According to Livy and Dionysius, the Dioscuri had appeared at the battle as soldiers after the dictator, Aulus Postumius, made a vow to build a temple in their honor of the brothers if they came to his aid in battle.[122] After the Romans routed the Latins, the brothers also appeared in Rome, in the guise of two handsome young soldiers dressed in military garb and accompanied by horses, to announce the Roman victory.[123] Throughout the Republic, the Dioscuri continued to appear from time to time to predict great military triumphs; they allegedly announced Roman successes before the battles of Pydna, Vercellae, and Pharsalus.[124] As tall, handsome cavalrymen, devoted above all to Roman military success, Castor and Pollux symbolized the ideal Roman soldiers.[125]

While the association of Castor and Pollux with Roman victories echoes the centrality of fraternity in Roman military ideology that we have seen above, the paradigm of brotherhood that they embodied differed in a key way from the previous examples. Within a Roman cultural framework, Castor and Pollux's brotherhood was far from ideal. They did not share the same paternity nor did they have the same "status" – the latter, the son of Zeus and Leda, was divine, while the former, the son of Tyndareus and Leda, was mortal.[126] Rather, what signified their fraternal connection in Roman imagination was their joint appearance in relation to Roman military victories.[127] They were brothers who, in the words of Armstrong, were linked by "the bond of fraternity defined by unity in battle."[128]

This paradigm of brotherhood between soldiers in spite of differences in parentage and status was valuable in constructing community in the

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121 Nielsen and Poulsen 1992, 46-53 affirm the date of the fifth century BCE for the temple. There is some evidence that a similar story also existed in the Greek tradition after Aegospotammi in 405 BCE (Plut. *Lys*. 12.1).

122 Livy 2.20.12; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.11.

123 Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.13.1.

124 Pydna: Cic. *Nat. D*. 2.2.6; Vercellae: Plin. *NH* 7.22; Flor. 2.38; Pharsalus: *Pan. lat*. 2.39.4. Gartrell 2021, 84-99 discusses the epiphanies of Castor and Pollux in military context in detail.

125 Champlin 2011, 74.

126 Harris 1906, 58-62; Gartrell 2021, 16-18 discusses the latent inequality of the relationship between Castor and Pollux in the Greek tradition.

127 Champlin 2011, 74-75; Armstrong 2013, 60.

128 Armstrong 2013, 60.

Roman armies of the Middle Republic.[129] For soldiers who came from a wide range of social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds, Castor and Pollux offered a model of fraternity defined by shared military service that looked beyond their differences. Additionally, the ideology of fraternity continually reaffirmed itself. As Bannon has shown, one of the central characteristics of brotherhood in Roman thought was equality.[130] The inclusive definition of military brotherhood primed soldiers, particularly those on the margins, to imagine themselves as equals in spite of very real differences and, as a result, promoted a stronger sense of cohesion among its constituents.

1.5: Conclusion

Over the course of the third and second centuries BCE, the Roman armies underwent a significant transformation. What was once an *ad hoc* small citizen-militia carrying out short-term, small-scale campaigns not far from home now had become an established socio-political institution that commissioned thousands of soldiers, many of whom were not Roman citizens, across the Mediterranean for prolonged periods of time. We have seen in this chapter that these new conditions as well as the shared hardships transformed a diverse group of men from a variety of social, ethnic, and economic backgrounds into a cohesive community. Moreover, this sense of community was, in turn, reinforced by ideologies that framed military service in terms of communal constructions, such as the polis, the home, and the family. These metaphors were particularly effective because they drew on atavistic notions of community that were comprehensible to all inhabitants. It should, of course, not be surprising that the Romans actively encouraged the development of close bonds between the soldiers serving in the army. Fighting forces which share a strong sense of affinity with one another, it stands to reason, are more likely to be successful in military operations. However, as the second half of this work will demonstrate, these structures of community did not just function to strengthen Rome's military capabilities. They served as a foundation for Roman soldiers to shape the communities that they lived in and gave them the ability to act collectively in order to protect their own interests.

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129 Armstrong 2013, 54-55. The first century BCE intellectual, Nigidius Figulus, perhaps summed up this conception of Roman brotherhood best in attempting to provide an etymology for the term *frater*: "a brother…is called *frater* because he is, *fere alter*, nearly an alter-ego" (Nigidius Figulus *Gramm*. 28; Gell. *NA* 13.10.4: *frater…est dictus quasi fere alter*).

130 Bannon 1997, 30-35, 41-43.